OUTLINES FROM PLATO

AN INTRODUCTION TO GREEK METAPHYSICS

BY

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PREFACE

This selection of passages is primarily intended for students of the Oxford school of *Literae Humaniores*, but the compiler hopes that it may also be found useful by any others who are commencing their study of Plato, on its metaphysical or logical side. Some slight experience of teaching, coupled with his own recollection of early days, has convinced him that merely to give pupils a list of references to parallel passages, bearing on any particular point under discussion, is in most cases quite inadequate. And yet no single dialogue, not even one so comprehensive as the *Republic*, can be understood without a knowledge of much contained elsewhere; and to know all about one involves knowing something about all.

The author, however, admits that his original design was not to illustrate Plato. It was rather to put into Greek dress the more permanent problems of Metaphysics in all ages, and to show that the questions which to-day divide philosophers were most of them raised and debated years ago by the Greeks, with all the additional power and lucidity that their unrivalled language lent them. Such an object proved subsequently to be chimerical; and, having determined to draw his illustrations of these problems from the writings of Plato, the compiler was gradually obliged to limit himself to a rudimentary exegesis of Plato. That this contains very likely many serious defects he is well aware, but he trusts that they are not of sufficient moment seriously to mislead beginners,

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for whom alone the book is designed. A graver objection, perhaps, may be brought against its method, and many may demur to a procedure which quotes a dialogue of one period in illustration of one belonging to quite another. In answer, the compiler would plead his original design, in accordance with which he has begun with the *Theaetetus*, thus plunging *in medias res*; and he would also ask to be allowed to doubt whether, in spite of the lately accumulated stylistic evidence, it is not still premature to acquiesce in any settled historical order for the dialogues.

A translation has been added on the advice of a friend, and if the author has substituted one of his own for those that were ready to his hand, it was only because again he desired to render the Greek into more modern philosophical terminology, and he is fully conscious of the uncouthness and verbosity he has thereby displayed. The passages are not always continuous, but no trouble will be found, it is hoped, in picking them up from a complete text, which, as far as was accessible, has here been the new Oxford edition. For the sake of readers chiefly occupied with the *Republic* the quotations from this dialogue are printed in heavier type.

The compiler takes this opportunity to thank the friends who have kindly read the selection and helped him with various suggestions. It would be unbecoming to mention these by name in connexion with a work so slight, and might also be misleading, since they are in no wise the sponsors of any thing contained in it.

Oxford, *May* 1905.

I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STARTING-POINT

BEFORE beginning the study of Metaphysics we need a definition of the term. Amongst many that might pass let us construct two:— A

(*a*) The investigation of the meaning of Reality;

(*b*) The study of the conditions of Knowledge.

The two easily and naturally run up into each other, since Object and Subject, which they respectively accentuate, cannot be sharply divided.

Now to both alike a solution is obviously suggested by an examination of sense-perception; for the plain man not unnaturally answers that Reality is the world as known by his senses, and that Knowledge lies in the right use of these: in other words he would proceed with Locke, 'by looking into his own understanding and seeing how it wrought.' But as the inquirer, starting thus *ab initio*, keeps himself rigidly to himself, in the attempt to discover what and how he himself knows, it is not surprising that amongst the earliest answers to the problem we get an extreme form of individualism, whose formula is expressed thus:—

Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων i
ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν[1]. *Theaet.* 152 A.

'Each man is the measure of all things, constituting by himself both the existence of things

[1] For *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* see § J.

A existent and the non-existence of things non-existent.'

The grounds for this extreme individualism are twofold—(1) subjective, the differences in human organisms, (2) objective, the physical conditions of sensation itself.

ii (1) Πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ ὁ δ' οὔ; καὶ μάλα. πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ; ἔοικεν. οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρῳ; ναί. τὸ δέ γε 'φαίνεται' αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν; ἔστι γάρ· φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις· οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. *Theaet.* 152 B.

'With the same wind blowing, does not one of us feel cold and another not? Certainly. In such cases shall we say that the wind itself is cold or not cold, or shall we hold with Protagoras that for him who feels cold it is cold, and for him who does not it is not? I suppose so. In both cases it is a question of appearance? Yes. But appearance implies sensation? Granted. Appearance, therefore, and sensation, in judging of heat and all similar qualities, are identical, if it is true that the reports of each man's senses are what constitute for him reality.'

(2) Sensation is the result of the action of external molecular stimulus (*τὸ ποιοῦν*) upon the internal nervous organism (*τὸ πάσχον*). From their interaction arises both the sensation and its object, neither of which exists independently. Indeed phenomena cannot be said to exist at all: they merely come into being (*γίγνεται*) for each sentient subject (*τινί*).

A iii

Ἐκ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.

Theaet. 152 D.

'All sensible objects are but temporary products of rhythmical movement and interaction of forces, and though we attribute existence to them we are at fault in our terminology: the truth being that nothing ever exists, but on every occasion merely becomes.'

iv

Ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός. *Theaet.* 153 E.

'Every visible quality will clearly be a result of contact between the eyes on the one hand and the external motion naturally adapted to affect them on the other: in short, it will be neither that which meets this motion nor the motion that is thus met, but with each individual alike it will be a *tertium quid*,—a product peculiar to himself.'

v

Ἐκ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. *Theaet.* 156 A.

'It is from the mutual relations and contact between these two kinds of motion that there results, on the one hand the sensible object, and on the other the sensation of this object, the latter being always thrown up as a concomitant product with the former.'

vi

Οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι συνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι. *Theaet.* 157 A.

'The external or objective element has no definite qualification till after contact with the internal or subjective, nor has the latter until it meets the former.'

A vi Λέγομεν ἓν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα γίγνεσθαι τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. *Theaet.* 182 A.

'Our contention is that nothing has independent existence, neither the objective nor the subjective element, but that these two, by their inter-relation, produce our sensations on the one side and sensible objects on the other, whereby, not only do these objects receive definitive qualities, but at the same time our senses become actually sensible of them.'

vii Ὥστε οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' 'εἶναι' πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον.

Καὶ εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει 'τινί' εἶναι ἢ 'τινὸς' ἢ 'πρός τι' ῥητέον αὐτῷ εἴτε γίγνεσθαι.

Γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκύ, ἀδυνατὸν γενέσθαι.

Theaet. 157 A.

'Nothing therefore exists independently and universally, but on all occasions presents itself solely as an appearance to some individual subject, and the term "existence" should be generally eradicated.'

'And when we say that something exists we should always add "for a certain individual," or "as the content of some one's thought"; or "in relation to something else"; the same holding good also of becoming.'

'That a thing should appear as sweet, independently of some sentient subject, is a contradiction in terms.'

These passages, especially the last, seem at first sight to express as clearly as is possible the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, or rather the truth that subject and object are correlatives; that, in other words, the existence of an object apart from a subject that knows it, and the existence of a subject apart

from objects known by it are equally unintelligible. A
We shall see, however, that the Greeks had not a firm hold on this commonplace of modern thought, and their failure in this respect led to frequent confusion. The standpoint here throughout is always dualistic; the sensible or material world on the one hand, existing in its own indefeasible right, and a sentient organism on the other, which somehow, through its peculiar structure, is capable of being impressed by this independent matter, which it thereupon becomes aware of through psychical processes representing physical counterparts. All that the above phrases imply, therefore, is that such qualities as heat and cold, sweet and sour, &c., are purely subjective, though they may be due in part to certain molecular movements of matter. As we shall see later, modern idealism is really based on an extension of the dictum *γλυκὺ γὰρ μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι*, and embraces not merely qualities that obviously have no existence apart from feelings of the body, but every possible attribute of the material world, all of which alike it holds to be relative to a thinking subject.

Bearing in mind, therefore, that our attitude is at B
present a purely psychological one, we can now view the results of such extreme individualistic sensationalism, where knowledge is simply identified with sense-perception, or rather with unqualified sensation, whose formula is *οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις*. It involves the impossibility of not only predication, which would generally be accepted as the common factor and indispensable condition of all knowledge, but even of nomenclature. For if the real is nothing more than the ceaseless flux of sense, changing every

B moment and for every individual, clearly nothing can be named. The most we can do is to express by mere sounds the recurring changes as they flow[1]. To give any feeling or sensation a name implies fixity and identity, and such is, *ex hypothesi*, impossible. Each sensation has, and has not, every possible quality, for we cannot even call it 'this' or 'that,' as such terms at once arrest the constant stream which we assume. Even the recipient of the sensations must not call them 'his,' for that would be to take them out of their place—if 'place' indeed they can be said to have—in the flux, and to endue them with the permanency of a permanent subject; whereas we are now assuming nothing but a ceaseless succession of psychical states. Whether there can be such psychical states apart from the unity given by a ψυχή, or whether a succession of feelings 'in time' can be known as such, except by a principle which itself is not 'in time,' we shall have to inquire later. At present we notice that this form of sensationalism entails the destruction of all language.

viii Οὐ δεῖ οὔτε 'τι' συγχωρεῖν οὔτε 'του' οὔτ' 'ἐμοῦ' οὔτε 'τόδε' οὔτ' 'ἐκεῖνο' οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα, ὅ τι ἂν ἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα· ὡς ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν.

'We have no right to admit the term "something" or "somebody's" or "mine" or "this" or "that" or any word whatever implying fixity, but as phenomena pass before us, through their origin, their cessation, and their various transformations, we should mark each successive change by mere sounds which nature may suggest, since any attempt

[1] Cf. T. H. Green, Introd. to Hume, §§ 213, 205.

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν, καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι 'ἄνθρωπόν' τε τίθενται καὶ 'λίθον' καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος. *Theaet.* 157 B. **B viii**

to fix them by the use of rational language is open to obvious and fatal objections.

'These strictures apply both to proper and to common terms, such as "man," "stone," and every other animal and species.'

For, suppose we name a sensation that of 'whiteness':

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει (since πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει)—τὸ 'λευκὸν' ῥεῖν τὸ ῥέον,—ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χρόαν ἵνα μὴ ἁλῷ ταύτῃ μένον, ἆρά ποτε οἷόν τέ τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν; καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἅτε δὴ ῥέον; τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν; οὔκουν δεῖ γε εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. οὔτε ἄρα ὁρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην **ix**

'Since it is a fact that there is no permanency even in this point, viz. that this particular flux should continue to flow as "white," but, on the contrary, undergoes a change, with the result that the very thing we are considering, i. e. whiteness, also partakes of the flux and passes into another colour, refusing to be convicted of definite attributes, can we ever speak of any specific colour without an abuse of language? I can't see the possibility, Socrates. And the same applies to all similar qualities, if the thing escapes you as fast as you predicate the word. What then are we to say about any one of the senses, e. g. that of sight or sound,—that they ever exhibit any permanency in the sight or the sound? Obviously we cannot, if motion is universal. Our conclusion, therefore, forbids us to speak of seeing any object any more than of not

B ix αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μή, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. *Theaet.* 182 D.

seeing it; and similarly with any other of the senses, if we accept this doctrine of universal and all-pervading change. It does.'

The logical result of this total absence of permanency is the breakdown of all order in the qualities of the objects of our supposed knowledge, since everything may, on this view, exhibit any and every possible attribute, including contradictories. For we are assuming now that ἐπιστήμη is simply the equivalent of αἴσθησις; and, therefore, if the sense of touch, e. g., reports an object as now hard, and now, in comparison with something else, as soft, then the same thing evidently possesses contrary qualities. For our formula forbids us to inquire into the grounds of the paradox, since all relations constituted by the mind for itself, to help it to right judgement upon its sensations, are on this theory strictly precluded. The world becomes a chaos instead of a cosmos.

x Τὸ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, 'οὕτω' τε 'ἔχειν' φάναι καὶ 'μὴ οὕτως,' εἰ δὲ βούλει, 'γίγνεσθαι,' ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι 'οὕτω' τε εἶπον καὶ

'We may take it that, on the hypothesis of universal movement, any one answer as to the quality of any given sensation has been shown to be just as correct as any other, and we may say indifferently "it is such" or "it is not such"; or, if you prefer it, "it *becomes* such," since we must avoid bringing these running gentlemen (sc. the Heracliteans) to any halt during our argument. A fair conclusion. Fair enough, Theodorus, with the

'οὐχ οὕτω.' δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ⟨τὸ⟩ 'οὕτω' λέγειν· οὐδὲ B
γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κινοῖτο ⟨τὸ⟩ 'οὕτω·' οὐδ' αὖ 'μὴ οὕτω·' οὐδὲ x
γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις· ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον, ὡς
νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ
μὴ ἄρα τὸ 'οὐδ' ὅπως.' *Theaet.* 183 A.

exception that I mentioned the words "such" and "not such"; whereas one has no right even to this term "such," which would imply an exception from the universal law of change, and so too with "not such" which is also the negation of change. In short, they must invent some other system of language; for, as things stand, they have no words capable of meeting the logical results of their own theory,—unless perhaps we make them a present of "nohow"!'

Such nihilism then is the direct conclusion from the premises of both Heracleitus and Protagoras, expressed either as *πάντα ῥεῖ* or *πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*. Such is the result of the unqualified statement that *ἐπιστήμη* = *αἴσθησις*, or that 'the real' is an unconnected or only casually connected congeries, where *τὸ ὄν* simply = *πολλά*, multiplicity.

II. ANALYSIS OF SENSATION

Now Heracleiteanism on its physical side may very C
well represent the substantial truth of the matter. Allowing for necessary imperfections in the formulating of the doctrine, due to the elementary state of contemporary Physics, we may admit the applicability of *πάντα ῥεῖ* to the ceaseless processes of Nature; and if this were all, if the mind were simply a sort of photographic plate on to which an eternal succession of pictures is impressed, each one gone as the next

C appears, with no active functions of its own to discriminate between them or between them and itself, then knowledge indeed would be a delusion, and we should have to acquiesce in the inevitable scepticism which is generally associated with the name of Heracleitus. Before doing so, however, it may be well to have another look at the act of sense-perception from which such nihilism is said to flow, in the hope of discovering some surer foothold, some principle or principles of unity in this multiplicity of sense.

The first and most obvious distinction revealed by such analysis is that between (1) qualities given by one particular sense, e. g. colour by the eyes, &c., and (2) qualities common to two or more of these senses e. g. number, figure, &c., as to which, whether they may be properly termed sensations or not, remains to be seen. The former are, roughly speaking, what Locke calls 'simple ideas,' Hume 'simple impressions,' and Aristotle *ἴδια αἰσθητά*, being also known as 'secondary qualities': the latter are distinguished as 'primary qualities,' and are by Locke attributed to the 'work of the mind'; they are also the *κοινὰ αἰσθητά* of Aristotle.

xi Καί μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἆρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης ; ἢ ἄλλου τινός ; οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ἦ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν ἃ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι'

Tell me,—the sources of your perception of heat, resistance, weight, sweetness, &c., would you not attribute them each and all to the body? Certainly, to nothing else. You are also prepared to admit that the reports given by one faculty cannot be obtained through another, e. g. those of sound through that of sight, or *vice versa*? Of course.

ἀκοῆς ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, C
οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὀργάνου οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου xi
περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. περὶ δὴ
φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ
ἀμφοτέρων ἦ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν ; ἔγωγε. οὐκοῦν
καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτόν ;
τί μήν ; καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο ἑκάτερον δὲ ἕν ; καὶ τοῦτο.
οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, δυνατὸς εἶ
ἐπισκέψασθαι ; ἴσως. (i. e. existence, identity, number, resemblance) ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν
διανοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ
κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό
τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι ᾧ τὸ 'ἔστιν'
ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ 'οὐκ ἔστι,' καὶ ἃ δὴ ἠρωτοῦμεν περὶ
αὐτῶν ; οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ
ἀνομοιότητα καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἕν τε καὶ

Then, supposing you notice some common property of both these reports, this thing, which is common to the two objects, could hardly be due to either one or the other of your two organs, in the way of sense-perception? Assuredly not. But, now, in the case of any given sound and colour, you surely, in the first place, do notice this common point about the two, viz. that they are both there together? Not a doubt of it. And further, that each is distinct from the other and identical with itself? Naturally. And that both together make two and either of them one? Even so. And, lastly, you are able to judge of their mutual likeness or unlikeness? Presumably. By what power do you notice these numerous properties of theirs, seeing that neither the ear alone nor the eye alone can possibly become cognizant of what is common to both? And what is the source of the faculty that reveals to us attributes, common alike to these and all objects of sense, which we designate by the terms "is," "is not," and the rest of the qualities we were discussing about them? You mean of course existence and non-existence, identity and distinction, singleness

C xi τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν. *Theaet.* 184 E.

and plurality. The solution of the problem, I confess, lies beyond me, except in this one point, that at all events I hold that there is no special sense-organ for the perception of such qualities as there are for those others, but that the mind apprehends these common properties by its own intrinsic faculties.'

Again, it is but a crude psychology which makes distinct compartments of the different senses, like the separate warriors in a wooden horse. Our senses are organic, and unified in the unity of consciousness.

xii Δεινὸν γάρ που, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά. *Theaet.* 184 D.

'Surely it is an extraordinary view which sees a number of separate senses implanted in us like soldiers packed into a wooden horse, instead of regarding them as all co-ordinated upon a single living principle—call it mind or what not,—which is the true source of all our sensations of objects, and merely uses the special senses as its instruments.'

Thus, then, we get at least a twofold origin of the conditions of knowledge, (1) the mere data of sense, and (2) the relations that thought or the mind puts upon them.

xiii Δείκνυμι δή, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾷς, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς

'What I wish to demonstrate, if you follow me, is this. Some of the reports of our senses make no appeal to the intellect for an inquiry into their

αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης. ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις; τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δῆλοι. C xiii

Οὗτοι, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι κ.τ.λ. (N.B. in this particular passage, although the argument does not require it to be stated, Plato would hardly allow that unqualified sensation tells us 'that a finger is a finger.') τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα, ἡ ὄψις ἆρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἡ ἁφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἆρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν, τί ποτε σημαίνει αὖτη ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει.

character, because sensation alone can deal adequately with them. Others, on the contrary, have to importune it for an investigation, on the ground that the findings of sense are altogether unsatisfactory. Whatever do you mean? Those which make no appeal are all those which do not pass over at one and the same time into precisely the opposite reports; whilst what I mean by saying that those which do so pass over make an appeal to the intellect is where sensation finds an object to have a certain quality equally with its precise opposite. Let us take these three fingers. Looking now at their respective height, can we say that sight sees adequately here, and that it is immaterial to its decisions what may be the relative position of the three? Again, too, with their respective breadth and hardness as determined by touch and the remaining senses, must we not admit that their findings on these points are quite unsatisfactory? In such cases the mind is inevitably bewildered as to the precise meaning attaching to "hardness," when the same

C xiii εἰκότως ἄρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμόν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴτε ἓν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων. πῶς δ' οὔ; οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται; ναί. εἰ ἄρα ἓν ἑκάτερον ἀμφότερα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει ἀλλ' ἕν. *Rep.* 523 A.

sense afterwards finds the selfsame object to be also "soft." It therefore has recourse to its powers of calculation and pure intellect, to enable it to determine whether each pair of these reports is single or double. Certainly. If they are found to be double, then each of the two is seen to be one by itself and different from the others; and therefore the mind must distinguish between the two at the moment of sensation, since, if they were not so distinguished, it would have regarded them as one and not two.'

These primary qualities therefore of number, identity, degree, figure, &c., are 'the work of the mind.' The data of sense only become intelligible when they are as it were, run into these moulds. The field of sight, or any other special sense, is continuous and undistinguished until the mind breaks it up and separates part from part; or at least these distinctions, if sensible at all, are only so very vaguely and almost unconsciously before the active attention of the mind.

It may be true that sensations are only known through their contrasts, that is to say, that if the eye, e. g., had only one colour always before it, it would have no conception of colour, and to this degree sensations may be said to distinguish themselves; and so with all feelings. But even in this limited sense of we must we must remember that such distinction implies a consciousness that is equally present to the two contrasted impressions of sense, and is itself

neither one nor the other. And when we get on to C
the further stage of self-conscious reflection upon our sensations, we see clearly the inadequacy of mere feeling to furnish the concepts which really are the important things in the building up of knowledge. Let us suppose a succession of graduated sense-impressions or feelings; e. g. we say that we see a large stone, i. e. in comparison with a smaller one by its side, which we afterwards call small by contrast with the rock from which it fell. Doubtless in each case the impressions are actually felt, and determined in their feeling, by relation to each other. As Plato says, sight *sees* the small and the great. But this determination of one feeling by contrast with another experienced immediately before or after it, is a very different thing from the self-conscious reflection upon the ambiguities of the reports of sense, from which arise, not merely other feelings, but the purely mental or abstract concepts of 'the large,' 'the great,' &c.[1] And it is these general ideas derived by the self-originating activity of the mind that make any knowledge possible, beyond merely individual experience.

Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις (sc. as well as νόησις) καὶ σμικρὸν xiv
ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι.
ἦ γάρ; ναί. διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν
ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα,

'Sight too, as we say, saw the great and the small, though not as clearly distinguished, but only in a sort of confused presentation. You understand? Yes. And it was to bring clearness into this apparent contradiction that the intellect had to undertake the task of also viewing the great and the small, not now as confused, but as sharply

[1] Green, Introd. § 213.

C xiv τοὐναντίον ἢ 'κείνη. ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ 'τὸ μέγα' αὖ καὶ 'τὸ σμικρόν'; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' ὁρατόν. ὀρθότατ', ἔφη. *Rep.* 524 C.

distinguished, just the opposite to the procedure of sight. Perfectly true. Hence it is that there first arises in our minds to ask the definite question "What do I mean by greatness and smallness?" And this, finally, is the reason why the latter aspect is rightly termed "intellectual" and the former visual. Most true.'

D Knowledge thus requires from its first stages the action upon the reports of the senses of something other than sense; of a principle which has from the beginning the conception of Existence or Reality as fundamental to all cognition. The unity of Being, to use the Eleatic phrase, is found in the primordial self-distinction of a subject from its object, simultaneous with the consciousness of its own unity. Such a principle involves, secondly, at least the power of bringing to bear upon the manifold of sense the conceptions of number, figure, resemblance, &c.; in other words, it must be endowed with the 'categories' of Kant.

From the passages already quoted, it will have been noticed how much insistence Plato lays upon the fact that each one of our sensations is always recognized by us as having 'existence.' And indeed, like Kant after him, he rightly found in this fact the foundation for all permanency in the subject-matter of cognition. By a real world we can only mean a world which we recognize as existing, and the recognition of its existence is given in every act of sense-perception. Moreover, such a world must be a cosmos and not

chaos, for, from the very nature of the knowing subject, the objects known must form an ordered whole. They are one in virtue of their common relation to one consciousness. In this latter there further lies the possibility of infinite synthesis, for no part of a world that is knowable can lie outside of what is already known, so long as we are considering the same knowing subject. Unity, therefore, and order, as Plato insists, are the most primitive and the most fundamental characteristics of human knowledge, however much we may trace back the beginning of that knowledge to the senses. These are its salient marks, and not, as the followers of Heracleitus and Protagoras would have us believe, mere unconnected change that is alike for no two minds. D

Yet while Plato constantly points out the necessary unity of knowledge involved in the objectifying of our sensations, he does not perhaps insist to the same extent upon its necessary corollary and complement, viz. the unity of the knowing subject, or, as Kant calls it, 'the synthetic unity of apperception.' I know a world, but I know it also as mine, and in this conscious distinction of subject from object, involving the simultaneous existence of both, has generally been found the strongest argument for personal identity. *Cogito, ergo sum.* Such identity Hume, of course, failed to find in his account of the processes of knowledge[1]. And yet it was in this unity that Plato found salvation from Heracleitean scepticism; this remains for him the bed-rock of permanency in the ceaseless flow of sense impressions. Finally, we may

[1] Cf. *Human Nature*, Pt. IV. § 6.

D note that Plato, whilst revealing the pre-suppositions necessarily implied in the fact of human knowledge, takes the opportunity of reminding us that we may be all along quite unconscious of their nature and even of their very existence, but that that is no argument against their validity, even as a knowledge of the constituents of the atmosphere is not necessary to a man's breathing.

XV Ἔχε δή· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται [sc. ἡ ψυχή], καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως; ναί. τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν, καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν (1) τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει, (2) τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας

'Be so good as to say whether it is not through touch that the mind has sense-perception of the hardness of a hard object and the softness of a soft one. Certainly. But now, as to their reality, and that the two exist, and as to their mutual opposition, and again as to the reality of such opposition, here it is surely the mind by its own intrinsic powers that attempts to distinguish them for us by harking back and comparing the two together. I quite agree. It follows then that, whilst man and the lower animals alike possess from birth a natural power of receiving certain sense impressions—I mean all that simply come in through the body as feelings, on their way to the central consciousness—all reflection on these impressions, on the other hand, with regard to their reality or utility, only makes its appearance after a long period of strenuous education, and then

παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. D xv

Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας; ἀδύνατον. οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται; καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ. *Theaet.* 186 B.

only in a few privileged minds. Undoubtedly it is so.

And yet nobody can arrive at Truth who lacks the conception of Existence; and, similarly, he who misses the truth of any object of study how can he be said to know that object? Impossible. Our conclusion therefore is that knowledge lies not in the feelings given us by sense, but in our ordered reasoning upon these feelings.'

To sum up. The inadequacy of sense alone in the construction of knowledge or experience seems incontestable. There is needed beside an active, self-determining principle, call it the *Ego*, self-consciousness, or what not, whose function is to review, control, and decide upon the reports of sense. (Cf. above *συλλογισμὸς περὶ παθημάτων.*) To this principle, or at least to this principle conjoined with sense, we must look for the origin of any knowledge of a connected world.

Τοσοῦτον προβεβήκαμεν ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. *Theaet.* 187 A. xvi

'We have then cleared the ground to this extent, that we utterly refuse to look for knowledge in sensation, but in that principle, whatever be the name we choose to give the mind, which is seen at work when the intellect by its own unaided powers is busied upon the inter-relations of the real.'

III. THE SUBSTRATUM OF SENSE

E But if we distinguish between sense and the work of the mind, as two separate origins of experience, we have still to ask where does sensation end and the work of the mind begin. Push back the synthetic action of the *Ego* as far as we can, take any piece of sense-experience and strip it of every mental relation superimposed by such action, and surely there will then emerge a sensation pure and simple and without qualification. Let us then examine again our secondary qualities, the ἴδια αἰσθητά of the special senses, and go in search of the 'simple idea' of Locke in its nakedness.

Take the theory, generally associated with Antisthenes, that the ultimately real are unconnected elements. Physically regarded they may be held to represent an atomic view of the universe which results from the interaction of blind particles. Regarded psychologically, they represent 'mere sensations' or feelings, quite unrelated to each other, the 'simple ideas' of Locke, that are 'given' to the mind, unqualified by any comparison or distinction *inter se*; of which, just because they are thus unqualified, nothing whatever can be specified. They exist 'in themselves,' apart from all mental categories. An analogous theory, though the analogy must not be pressed, is that of Kant's 'things in themselves,' as the ultimate residuum of the phenomenal world, independent of the mind, which by its categories of thought and forms of Time and Space 'makes nature.' With Kant, however, these are suprasensible, whereas the theory we are now considering regards them as sensible. From

these ultimate elements the whole physical universe is compounded, and from them also, viewed psychologically, knowledge is derived by the action of the mind's Reason. In themselves they are outside reason, being merely 'data,' which the rational principle of man receives and works up into an ordered whole. For the simplest form of knowledge implies predication and judgement, even if it goes no further than the conviction that 'this (feeling) is.' Anything more than such predication of mere existence involves the relation of subject and attribute, or to put it differently, the connexion between one set of sensations and another, carrying with it the idea of substance and objectivity. When we say 'snow falls,' 'snow is white,' 'snow melts,' it is the predication of different qualities of the same thing, or the expression of the relation between such different sensations that converts the irrational and unrelated into a reasoned cosmos of experience. For knowledge proceeds by judgements, and the essence of a judgement is a combination of terms. The progress of knowledge then from its elements is parallel to the formation of syllables and words from the letters of an alphabet. E

xvii Ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι

'I seem to have heard from a certain school of thinkers a view which holds that what we may term the ultimate elements of things, out of which we and the rest of the universe are compounded, are wholly without rational connexion. Each element can therefore merely be taken singly and named, any predication of qualities being out of the question. Not even existence or non-existence may

E xvii *μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ 'αὐτὸ' οὐδὲ τὸ 'ἐκεῖνο' οὐδὲ τὸ 'ἕκαστον,' οὐδὲ τὸ 'μόνον' οὐδὲ τὸ 'τοῦτο' προσοιστέον, οὐδὲ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς.* *Theaet.* 201 E.

be affirmed of them, for either of these predicates at once involves an addition; whereas no judgement whatever can legitimately be made about them, if we are limited to a bare recital of the name of each individual. Nay, we must exclude even the terms "each" and "individual," "this," "that," "it," &c., for the only possession any element has is that of a name. On the other hand, their present existing compounds being themselves combinations, the terms which can be applied to them have likewise been combined together and so yielded rational discourse, the essence of which is combination of terms. Thus the theory asserts that while the elements of knowledge are irrational and unknowable, though perceptible by sense, their compounds are knowable, capable of verbal expression, and form the subject-matter of right opinion.'

Such a theory is beset with the same difficulties as the Heracleitean flux. The thing we are in search of, *τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ἄγνωστον, αἰσθητὸν δέ*, seems a contradiction in terms. A wholly unqualified sensation would appear an impossibility. Apart from the fact that there is evidence that all our special sense-organs have been developed from that of Touch, so that no

'δία αἴσθησις could be uncompounded or simple, it is clear that sensations are only known by contrasts, and under the law of relativity [1]. It is also open to the obstacles lying in the way of any form of Dualism, which would generate the spiritual from the natural, and ascribe to Nature an existence independent of a Subject. For however strongly we may refuse to recognize the presence of Thought or Reason in Nature, to this extent at least Nature must be rational, that the world is throughout an ordered cosmos, and that to whatever point we carry our analysis of Matter or the processes of sensation, the element must still bear a fixed relation to the complex resultant, both or neither being equally knowable, and neither having, as far as we can think, any but a phenomenal existence, or, in other words, as the object of a subject. If the elements are unknowable then, whether the product be (*a*) their sum total or, (*b*) something additional to that [2], product and element stand on the same ground. Such a view, however, is confuted by the very analogy on which it rests, for words and syllables are known only after the letters are learnt, and these have to be learnt most thoroughly of all. The elements of knowledge, therefore, even if we decide that these are given by sense, are truly real and knowable. **E**

Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται; πάνυ γε. πάλιν δή, οὐκ, xviii

'We have admitted that in anything which is divisible into parts the completed whole is just the

[1] Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, V. A.

[2] e.g. Is my pen, as I know it, merely a combination of various sense impressions supposed to be wholly unqualified or related to each other, or is it a unit or idea transcending these, as the chemical compound transcends its elements?

E xviii εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι ; οὕτως.

Τί δ' ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ' ἐκείνης ; οὐδαμῶς. παντάπασι δὴ κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. ἔοικε. μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ 'εἶναι' περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ 'τοῦτο,' ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὖτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ ; μέμνημαι. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα ; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

sum total of these parts? We have. Of two alternatives, therefore, one. If our compound is something other than its elements, then these cannot be regarded as its constituent parts; if, however, it be identical with them, then it and they are equally knowable. Most certainly. Once more, if these elements are not what constitute the parts of the compound, it is difficult to see what parts can be found for it which should not also be its elements. It is. The trend of the argument therefore seems to exhibit our compound as a single, independent and indivisible concept. It certainly does. But to hark back, we admitted as a fair statement the view that the primary elements of both knowledge and reality were devoid of all rational connexion, being merely a series of disconnected units, of which not even bare existence or numerical specification could be predicated, on the ground that these also are distinct and alien terms, and it was this complete independence which, as we saw, put them beyond the pale of reason or of knowledge. I recall it perfectly. But, now, surely our compound has fallen into the same *impasse*, if it be without parts, and a single completed concept?

(*a*) Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ συλλαβή ἐστι καὶ **E** ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ τε συλλαβαὶ xviii γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. καὶ μάλα. (*b*) εἰ δέ γε ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον. *Theaet.* 205 A.

Not a doubt about it. Well then, (*a*) taking the view that the compound is simply the sum total of numerous elements which form its constituent parts, it follows that compound and element are equally knowable and equally capable of expression by language. (*b*) Regarding it as an indivisible unit, then compound no less than element is outside reason and outside knowledge, and for exactly the same cause. The result is that we refuse adhesion to any theory which allows the present existing objects of the world to be the subject-matter of both knowledge and language, but excludes from both the elements which went to form them.'

Let us gather up the results of our psychological **F** analysis of Sensation. For the perception of the simplest object of knowledge there seems to be necessary the action of some permanent principle to act as a *punctum stans* in the ceaseless stream of sense. Every such object must also, at least implicitly, be presented as having existence (*οὐσία*), self-identity (*ἕν τι, ταὐτόν*), likeness or unlikeness to others (*ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης*). Further, one may say that every object of thought is, through these necessary categories, constituted an implicit universal; for, in being conceived by the mind as an individual, it is thereby also conceived of as an instance of a class, as one amongst numberless possible fellows.

F Again we have seen that the Real is not simply unqualified Unity, any more than it is unrelated Multiplicity: from the beginning we must have similarity and dissimilarity, unity in plurality. Every term, whether singular or general, exhibits this characteristic of the One and the Many in either its connotation or its denotation or in both.

IV. THE HYPOSTATIZED CONCEPT

G Our new starting-point therefore will lie in the direction already suggested by the results of the past criticism, in the phrase marked above, *Μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος*.

From the outset there has been present the help of language: thought has been articulate. If now from the analysis of the act of Sensation we turn to the investigation of words which embody its cumulated results, we are at once brought face to face with what the Greeks described as the mystery of the One and the Many. Though the senses give us only individuals, yet we can only know these by giving them a common name, which must have, it would seem, something definite connoted by it. Yet the general concept can never be identical with any one of the individuals denoted by its name, for no two individuals are quite alike, but always have properties peculiar to themselves. Thus individual as well as general terms represent both 'one' and 'many.'

Inasmuch however as all objects alike, whether general or individual, must through their common rela-

tion to a single subject *ipso facto* be definitely related amongst themselves, this mystery of the One and the Many remains a fundamental aspect of Thought and the ground of all possible knowledge. G

xix *Φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί, καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. Phil.* 15 D.

'We hold that this identity of Unity and Plurality pervades every possible subject of rational speech, and has always done so from the beginning. It is a necessary truth implied in the very nature of thought, an eternal characteristic of human reason.'

With the beginning of conscious reflection upon its attainments the mind becomes aware of these infinite relations existing among the subject-matter of knowledge. It finds that names have been given to objects through the possession of certain common qualities, generally those most obvious to sense, and that what is now required is to investigate the precise nature of these qualities, and the degrees in which the different objects, covered by the same name, possess them, as well as to determine their connexion with other qualities since discovered. Human knowledge, as far as it has yet gone, is analysed and classified. This is the great work undertaken in Greek Philosophy by Socrates and Plato, viz. to find general concepts underlying the individuals of Sense and then to establish their mutual relations. This, it will be seen, is an enterprise that falls essentially under the province of Logic. We have now left behind our psychological starting-point, to which the sceptics of sensationalism appealed for the justification of their

G tenets, and from which we, however, deduced something very different from empiricism. We have established a principle of fixity and permanency in the flow of sensation, and have found that this alone makes knowledge possible. What follows is to trace the further action of this free agent, or synthetic unity, upon the data which are presented to it, and which it alone renders intelligible. This is the peculiar function of logic, or, to use the term of Plato, which means much the same as our own, of Dialectic. The weapons of this Dialectic are, generally speaking, two.

A. The common qualities are discovered by analysis of the individuals denoted by the name: the resulting synthesis is the definition of the term (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας). The process itself is called συναγωγή; the connotation discovered forms the 'Idea.'

B. A clear and distinct knowledge of the meaning of the class-name being gained, the class itself can now be divided. This process is διαίρεσις.

xx Βούλει οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. *Rep.* 596 A.

'Let us then begin our investigation by our usual procedure. Wherever there exists a class of individuals called by the same name, there it is our practice to assume a single concept covering that class.'

xxi A. Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. ὥσπερ τὰ νυνδὴ περὶ Ἔρωτος—

'It is the power of taking a general survey of multifarious individuals and reducing them to a single concept, in order, by a definition of one's terms, to elucidate a subject any time under debate.

ὃ ἔστιν ὁρισθέν—εἴτ' εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη, τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ὁμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτα ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος. G xxi

E. g. in this discussion on Love, whether our definition was good or bad, at any rate whatever clearness and consistency the argument attained was due to these methods.

Β. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ τί λέγεις; τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκεν (i. e. natural, not artificial or verbal). τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστὴς τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν καλῶ διαλεκτικούς. *Phaedr.* 265, 266.

'The other method is the reverse of the above, and consists of dividing up the concept along its natural joints. Personally I am much addicted to the practice of these Definitions and Divisions, as it helps me both to teach and to think, and any others who have the art I call dialecticians.'

Καὶ μεγίστη γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πεῖρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μή, ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ. *Rep.* 537 C. xxii

'It is undoubtedly the most searching test between a mind that is dialectical and one that is not. For the dialectician is he who has the power of generalization, and he alone.'

Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτόν, μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι; ναί. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, xxiii

'Dialectical skill is I take it, exhibited in the distinguishing of kinds without confusing identical concepts with those that are different, and *vice versa*. It is. The possession of this power implies the successful discrimination of a single general idea from a number of scattered individuals that pervades them all without exception: it also sees sundry of these general ideas themselves comprehended under

G xxiii πάντῃ διατεταμένην, ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

Soph. 253 D.

a wider concept outside, although differing amongst themselves; and again it finds a single one that embraces several classes, whilst many too it finds to be altogether opposed to each other. This I call the knowledge of distinguishing in any given kind as to where the various concepts may combine with one another and where they may not.'

xxiv Ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν. τίς αὕτη; ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν χρῆσθαι δὲ παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. *Phil.* 16 B.

'An excellent method to which I am loyally devoted, but which has often eluded me and left me helpless; one easily described, but very difficult to use; for it is owing to this method that every discovery in the arts up to this day has been made.'

xxv Ἡ γενναία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. τί δή; ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν, καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

Rep. 454 A.

'Behold the magnificent proportions, Glaucon, of the great art of disputation, and how even unconsciously people slide into it, mistaking useless wrangling for progressive argument. Such error is due to a failure to conduct our inquiry in the light of logical division; instead of which, we fasten upon a merely verbal opposition in regard to our subject, substituting vain disputation for dialectical debate.'

The method of *συναγωγή* itself is that of tentative hypotheses. A provisional definition of any general term is started. Objections are raised and argued. Should any prove fatal, the definition is dropped as inconsistent with the facts of the case, to be replaced by one that will meet such. This in turn is debated (*διαλέγεσθαι*) and in turn may have to go ; the process being continued until a satisfactory definition, ' which can withstand the shock of battle,' is reached. The raising of such objections and their refutation is *ἔλεγχος* ; the provisional definitions are *ὑποθέσεις*, the true function of which is to act as ' starting-points and stepping-stones ' to the ultimate goal by means of the negative knowledge that their overthrow entails ; whilst finally the repeated discarding of these is termed *τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τὰς ὑποθέσεις*. G

Ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας ; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν ; οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος xxvi

' By a dialectical mind we mean one which insists upon a definition of the essential properties of any given object, and wherever there is inability to give such definition either to itself or to others, to that extent we refuse to recognize scientific knowledge of an object. Similarly with the good, it should be clearly distinguished from all other concepts and expressed by definition, and the mind should traverse every possible objection that can be levied against it, as though contending in battle, eager to reject every view that rests upon popular opinion and not

G xxvi ἐλέγχειν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἁπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται κτλ. *Rep.* 534 B.

on absolute truth, so as to preserve its definition inviolate through all these attacks.'

xxvii Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν κτλ. *Rep.* 533 C.

'Dialectic is a unique method in that it proceeds up to a first principle by the successive destruction of hypotheses.'

xxviii Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς κτλ. *Rep.* 511 B.

'By the second section of the half of the line representing the world of thought I would be understood to mean the field of pure reason apprehended by the power of dialectic, where hypotheses, though employed, are treated as such, viz. not as ultimate truths but as stepping-stones and starting-points to truth.'

It will be noticed that this method is also that of modern science. It is through hypotheses, and frequently a protracted succession of hypotheses, that the laws of Nature are finally established. The difference between Plato and modern science is that the former is engaged in arranging the knowledge of mankind already accumulated, by means of definition and division of current terms, with little reference, it may be, to the nature of things—a limitation due to the backward state of the physical sciences in his day—whilst the latter proceeds, not by argument alone, but also by the outward application of argument in experiment.

Yet even after so clearing the subject-matter of knowledge and arranging the parts in due relation to each other by Definition and Division, we shall not have reached certain truth. We can deal now, it is true, in general terms, but our propositions and our general ideas or concepts, so laboriously developed, will remain but partially known until we can lead up to the first and final principle of the universe, from which all depend and to which all ascend. Without this culminating idea our subordinate ideas will remain in reality but tentative and provisional, mere *ὑποθέσεις*. Their true nature is only known in the light of that principle which at once gives them existence and makes them intelligible. All things find their true expression in the light of 'the good.' This unifies knowledge; beyond this we cannot go. From its very nature it is incapable of proof; it is the *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος* of both Reality and Knowledge. H

This then, the *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ*, will be our widest general concept, prior even to Existence, embracing all things and all possible objects of thought. Having attained the view of this, we proceed to remake the world—not the sensible but the intelligible world—by arranging every possible concept under the ultimate *ἀρχή* in its proper order and place, from the widest to the narrowest. The world of knowledge, as thought of under general propositions, is thus one immense *σχῆμα* of logical Division (*διαίρεσις*) of concepts. It says good-bye to sense, and works in 'ideas,' or general concepts, alone.

Οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἂν ἄνευ πασῶν xxix

'A similar progress ensues along the pathway of dialectical inquiry, when, dropping all aid from the

H xxix τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν [ἕκαστον] ὁρμᾷ καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς; τί μήν; *Rep.* 532 A.

senses, the mind pierces through to the absolute essence of each successive concept, without once breaking off, until, by its own free powers, it realizes that of the absolute good, the culminating point of the world of thought, as the sun is of the world of sight. And this progress is properly termed dialectical.'

xxx Οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη. *Rep.* 511 B.

'Using them as stepping-stones and starting-points, in order to reach up to the first and final cause of things, beyond the region of hypothesis; when holding fast to this, the mind next turns round upon itself, and ranges down in descending order through its chain of concepts, till it reaches the lowest links of all, uncontaminated by any touch of sense and equipped only with ideas, through which it proceeds successively to others, finishing its descent in ideas and in ideas alone.'

With this wide and philosophic vision of the nature of human knowledge and its insistence upon unity it may not be amiss to compare the words of a very different writer, the late Mr. Herbert Spencer. 'Knowledge of the lowest kind,' he says, 'is ununified knowledge; science is partially unified knowledge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge[1].' Should we ask what are the wider *ἰδέαι* which thus

[1] *First Principles*, 2. l. 37.

have proximate contact with the ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ, we **H**
must turn to a treatise like the *Timaeus*. The widest laws of Nature do not present themselves in the same form to two ages so widely separated in time as those of Darwin and Democritus; and if we are inclined to substitute such conceptions as energy, force, electricity, &c., for 'the light,' 'the heavy,' circular motion, or mathematical figures, this must not blind us to the essential agreement between the two in their mode of looking at things.

But we must now return to our string of concepts, **I**
discovered by the processes of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις. How do we stand after our inquiry into their nature, and what is implied in the formula μία ἰδέα ἀμέριστος? We are not now concerned with the psychological explanation of the Concept, whether or not there exist in the ordinary person's mental history, as Berkeley denied of himself, any such distinct process as that called Abstraction, or again whether we can think of a general idea without making the image of an individual do duty for our purpose[1]. Something at any rate is connoted by every class name. This something is the 'Idea' of Plato. Into the relation between this idea and the individuals of sense more or less corresponding to it we shall have to inquire later (§§ P–W). At present it is at least clear that ideas are partly conceptual, i. e. are in the mind, and so far independent of Sense that we can summon them and dismiss them from our mind at will. They are, as Plato says, νοητά, and understood by νόησις, or intellect *par excellence*, and are not αἰσθητά. Phenomena, on the other hand, we know by sense-perception, although,

[1] Höffding, *Outlines*, V. B. III.

I of course, their recognition by us depends upon the concept in our minds. But, waiving the connexion between the two, it is true that in some sense we have two worlds, the world of phenomena, present to sensation, and the world of concepts or thought relations. And, further, the one is doubtless a state of constant change, the other is more or less permanent.

xxxi *Ἴωμεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία, ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;* ὡσαύτως, *ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων, ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτά ἐστιν;*

'Let us revert to our earlier argument. The actual and abstract essence of any object such as is expressed in the definitions we give one another, is it to be regarded as immutable or as varying from time to time? Abstract equality, abstract beauty, or any other matter, are these capable of even the slightest change, or must not the absolute nature of any of them be single and constant, always identical with itself, and never open to the semblance of variety? It must necessarily be as you say. But, now, take the multiplicity of things beautiful, e. g. men, horses, garments, &c., or again the multiplicity of things equal, and all other similar categories, do we here find constant identity, or is it not rather true that so far from being consistent with each other they are not even consistent with themselves?

I xxxi

οὕτως. οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἅψαιο κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; παντάπασιν, ἔφη. θῶμεν οὖν, εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές. *Phaed.* 78 C.

It is so. Does it not then follow that while these numerous individuals are known by one or more of the senses, such as touch, sight, &c., those other concepts, which are always constant, can only be apprehended by the synthetic action of the mind, being in their very nature invisible as opposed to visible? Most certainly. We are at liberty therefore to make two distinct classes of real objects, one visible, the other invisible.'

xxxii

Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. *Tim.* 27.

'We must first make a necessary distinction between what exists for ever and is never produced, and what is for ever being produced and exists never. The first of these two divisions is known by the mind through its powers of reasoning and is fixed for all time, the second is the subject-matter of opinion by the aid of unreasoning sensation, always coming into appearance and then passing away, and never attaining to true existence.'

xxxiii

Τά τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα. τὰ ποῖα; ἢ δ' ὅς. πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν

'Hark back to our previous statements, repeated so often on other occasions as well. Common language recognizes the existence of a plurality of things beautiful, good, &c.; and distinguishes them

I xxxiii τῷ λόγῳ. φαμὲν γάρ. καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν. ἔστι ταῦτα. καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁρᾶσθαί φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὔ, τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ' οὔ.

Rep. 507 A.

by words. On the other hand, we speak also of abstract beauty, abstract goodness, and the like, considering under one single idea what before we regarded as plural, and taking for granted that such exist in every case and represent the true being of things. The individuals we say are apprehended by sight and not by the intellect, but the ideas are grasped by the intellect and not by sight.'

Again,

xxxiv Πότε οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

(The error and fallaciousness of sense lie of course not in the sensations themselves but in the inferences drawn from them. Cf. p. 42 note.)

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; ναί. λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα ὅταν μηδὲν τούτων αὐτὴν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μήτε τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα

'How then does the mind attain to truth, seeing that all its essays towards thought when in conjunction with the body are vitiated by the latter's inherent fallaciousness? It can only be in its exercise of pure reason that any part of the real discovers itself to the mind, and this exercise is freest when unimpeded by corporeal sensations, such as sound or sight, or pleasure or pain, and when the mind can most effectively banish the body from its presence and be left alone with itself to

χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος. I xxxiv

'Ἡ φιλοσοφία ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθει δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δε εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγεσθαι, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὑτῇ, ὅταν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν ὄντων. ὅ τι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ, ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές. εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητόν τε καὶ ἀιδές. *Phaed.* 65 B, 83 A.

reach out into the realm of truth with as little association and connexion with the body as is here attainable.

Philosophy reveals the fact that the evidence of the eyes and ears and other senses is tainted with error, and it therefore urges the mind as far as is practicable to withdraw from contact with them, and to substitute abstract reasoning, trusting nothing but its own deliverances, obtained by its own reflections upon some part of absolute reality. Any results obtained through other organs, and which differ in different circumstances' (or 'with different individuals') 'it must always regard as false, distinguishing between the material world of sense and sight on the one hand, and, on the other, the world that is revealed to thought, intelligible and immaterial.'

The above passages, however, seem to claim a more than conceptual existence for the ideas, in virtue of which they transcend our mind and are independent of it. They are also regarded as permanent and unchangeable; on which it may be said that, although Truth is fixed and unalterable, yet we are at present far removed from its complete discovery, and that the answers of Science are constantly being revised, so

I that our 'ideas' are as variable as sensible things themselves[1]. On the other hand we too have these same two worlds that Plato seems to separate so sharply from each other. For Science is the organization of the laws of succession that are permanent in the constant flux of Nature, of the *nexus* of antecedents and consequents active or latent in sensible objects. In this way Science is a constantly progressive work of Definition, in proportion as the meaning, 'form,' or 'idea' of any class of objects is enriched; whilst parallel with this process goes always further Division.

But in Plato's day, through the infancy of the physical sciences, the notion, so familiar to ourselves, of the perpetual interrogation of Nature by patient experiment, was necessarily foreign to the mind. Hence there is with him no constant reference to individual phenomena in order to test the validity of general terms or 'ideas.' He takes the world as it was known in his time; and the current notions of things, often erroneous and fantastic and resting on unverified observation of the senses, are his only data. His Dialectic is one with Science in its method; but the absence of experiment, and the apparent absence of any conception of the progressive and necessarily provisional character of science, gives it an impression of unreality and barrenness. We too have our 'ideas,' for without them, as the aged Parmenides admits to the youthful Socrates, general knowledge is impossible. But we do not divorce the intelligible from the sensible world. We can see that a general proposition is true universally and necessarily only in the sense

[1] Jowett, Introd. to *Philebus*.

that whenever and wherever certain phenomena occur, I
or, as Plato would say, 'come into being'—γίγνεται—
then and there certain other phenomena also come
into being, and that, apart from the possibility of an
indefinite number of particulars, a universal has no
content.

V. ΔΟΞΑ

With the two worlds apparently so sharply distinguished, involving such a decided depreciation of the world of phenomena, there necessarily arises a corresponding distinction in the quality of the knowledge to be obtained about each. In the one case we are dealing with fixed ideas, grasped and held by pure intellect, which also determines their relations *inter se*, though as regards their accurate determination the vital necessity of verification is, as we have noticed, scarcely realized by the Greeks. The result of this reasoning by the mind upon its concepts will be a body of abstract truth causally connected: this alone deserves the name of knowledge—ἐπιστήμη, and the faculty that acquires it is νόησις or γνώμη (*Rep.* 476 f., 506 f.). As we have seen, its subject-matter is held to be unchangeable and eternal, for any distinct 'idea' is an unalterable unit; and, though they are related, they can never be confounded with each other.

On the other hand it is very different with J
sensible objects. Not only are they transitory, but
they have not even *in transitu* the unity found in
ideas. For every individual object is either more or

J less than the general concept under which it falls, seeing that it must have at least some properties that are peculiar to itself, and not specific or generic. Therefore that part of 'ideal' or scientific knowledge which deals with it will only hold good in any given case *up to a certain point*, for there is always some exception present which, as we say, proves the rule; and we have always mentally to add *ceteris paribus* in applying natural law to sensible objects. Knowledge about them thus appears somewhat uncertain, although the uncertainty, such as it is, lies not in the things, but in ourselves. We may say 'All trees are green' but we shall search in vain for any tree altogether green, and friction will always prevent the perfect fulfilment of the laws of motion. For, as the Greeks said, phenomena partake of both 'being' and 'not-being.' They contain the specific qualities, connoted by the class name or 'Idea,' but also something 'other' than these. To take Plato's example, no good act fails to be also not-good from some point of view. Such 'otherness' they called τὸ μὴ ὄν, a phrase of purely logical signification[1], since, as being an object of thought, it must always be equally 'real' with what is distinguished as τὸ ὄν. *Omnis negatio est determinatio.* Further, phenomena seem to have even contradictory qualities, and, indeed, have them, if viewed in different relations or aspects. A man, therefore, whose knowledge is limited to individual objects of sense, who knows these only in separation

[1] See esp. *Theaet.* 189, *Rep.* 478 B, and *Soph.* 239 D—241, where the logical character of τὸ μὴ ὄν is demonstrated. Error is shown to lie not in believing in something which does not exist, but in mistaking one piece of reality for another. It is therefore not ψευδὴς δόξα but ἀλλοδοξία. Cf. Green, *Proleg.* 12.

from each other and not as examples of an underlying law of Nature, and who can give no account (*λόγον διδόναι*) of their causal connexion with other phenomena, cannot be said to have knowledge proper but only opinion, *δόξα*: for such knowledge as he has is but empirical, and rests on no basis of ascertained general principles. Correspondingly, the world of phenomena, if understood only in this superficial and empirical manner, is the world of mere opinion, *τὸ δοξαστόν*. J

XXXV "Ἦ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστιν τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν—ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη;—οὔτε ἀμαθία—τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία;—ἔστι δὲ δήπου τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. *Symp.* 202 A.

'You have surely observed that there is a certain state of mind that is midway between knowledge and ignorance. To have correct opinions, without being able to explain them, can certainly not be described as knowledge, seeing that it is essentially an irrational state, though just as little as blank ignorance, considering that it involves acquaintance with true facts; but we can only designate it as correct opinion, lying between intelligence and ignorance.'

The distinction between Right Opinion and Knowledge goes to the root of Thought itself. We have seen that knowledge and existence itself implies neither unqualified unity nor unrelated multiplicity, but unity in plurality. If all were one, simply *ἕν*, knowledge is impossible, just as there could be no consciousness of a single sensation without another from which to distinguish it[1]; and if all were simply

[1] Höffding, *Outlines*, V. A.

J πολλά, unrelated to each other by a relating mind, knowledge is equally impossible. Hence we need at once similarity and diversity. These are the two principles of all Thought, which alone make Thought possible. Of these two elements therefore, in conjunction with a third representing their alliance, Plato makes the Soul of the World to have been originally fashioned by the Deity. This soul is engaged in eternal thought with itself upon the things that form its visible body, and ever distinguishes Identity and Diversity, as it approaches each in its ceaseless revolution. According as either of these two is accentuated there is begotten True Opinion on the one hand, or Knowledge on the other.

xxxvi Ὁ δὲ ψυχὴν συνεστήσατο ἐκ τῶνδέ τε καὶ τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. (*a*) τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας (*b*) καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς (*c*) τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ τῆς θατέρου. καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν. *Tim.* 34 C.

Καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὁρατὸν οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μέν, λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχή, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη

'The Creator composed the world-soul out of the following elements in the way to be described. (*a*) First the element of indivisibility and unchangeableness, (*b*) secondly the element of production divided amongst physical phenomena, and (*c*) thirdly in the middle place he put a blend of these other two, sc. identity and difference. These three separate elements he took, and mingled them into a single form.

Now although the body of the universe has been made visible, the soul is invisible, endowed with reason and harmony, being the most perfect creation of the perfect Creator amongst things intelligible and

τῶν γεννηθέντων. ἅτε οὖν (a) ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ (b) καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως (c) ἔκ τε οὐσίας τριῶν τούτων συγκραθεῖσα μοιρῶν, αὐτή τε ἀνακυκλουμένη πρὸς αὑτήν, ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τινος ἐφάπτηται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς ὅτῳ τ' ἄν τι ταὐτὸν ᾖ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον. ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται καὶ ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ὢν εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγείλῃ, δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς· ὅταν δὲ αὖ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ᾖ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ κύκλος εὔτροχος ὢν αὐτὰ μηνύσῃ, νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται. *Tim.* 36. J xxxvi

eternal. Being therefore a compound of three distinct elements, viz. (*a*) Identity, (*b*) Difference, (*c*) Substance, when, in its eternal revolutions upon itself, it meets with aught possessed of the scattered elements, or again the indivisible, it is stirred throughout itself and reports the similarity and the dissimilarity of objects. Whenever it is engaged upon the sensible, and the circle of Difference, revolving rightly, announces the various objects to the single united soul, opinions and beliefs are generated, both sound and true. When, however, it is directed to the objects of thought, and the circle of Identity, running freely, informs it of them, then there is inevitably seen the finished product of pure intellect and knowledge.'

The distinction therefore between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη* grows out of the old opposition of the One and the Many (§ G), and, broadly speaking, the man who has *ἐπιστήμη* is the man who can see the One in the Many, the single underlying law or cause, exemplified in the multiplicity of phenomena; whilst the man who has *δόξα* only is the man who cannot do this. The mind of *ὁ ὀρθὰ δοξάζων* exhibits a sort of maimed reason, or a reason not yet come to itself, for it does not display the threefold combination of the World-Soul; it has

J developed *τὴν θατέρου φύσιν* but not *τὴν ταὐτοῦ*, which also is essential for any knowledge of *οὐσία*. This further development, it will be remembered, is the *περιαγωγὴ τῆς ψυχῆς* of the *Republic*.

Such being the state of mind of the non-philosophic person, we may easily imagine what happens when he looks out on the apparently inexplicable variety of phenomena.

xxxvii Τούτων γὰρ δή, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. τί δέ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἧττόν τι ἡμίσεα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; οὐδέν. καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τἀναντία; οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἀεί, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται. *Rep.* 479 A.

'In this multiplicity of things beautiful is there one which cannot be made to appear ugly? or again with the manifold of things double, they are all equally halves. Similarly with things great and small or light and heavy, the precisely opposite qualities may be predicated of each in different relations.'

xxxviii Καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. *Rep.* 476 A.

'The same holds good of justice and injustice and all concepts alike; each is to be regarded in itself as one, though, since they always present themselves to us in conjunction with definite actions or persons, and even with one another, each has the appearance of being many.'

xxxix Εὑρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα

'Our conclusion seems to suggest that the various standards of mankind on the subject of the beautiful,

καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. εὑρήκαμεν. προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οὐ γνωστὸν δεῖ λέγεσθαι. *Rep.* 479 D. J xxxix

&c., oscillate perpetually as it were between absolute existence and absolute non-existence. And we agreed beforehand that, if any such sphere were discovered, it was to be regarded as the subject-matter of opinion and not of knowledge.'

Thus too of that Great Beast, Popular Opinion.

Ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. τὸ ποῖον; ἕκαστον τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσι κ.τ.λ. *Id.* 493 A. xl

Μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν (as contrasted with ὁ ἐπιστάμενος who can explain phenomena through the unity of a general concept and its definition).

ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο ἀναμνήσθητι· αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλά, ἢ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ

'One more point I would have you recognize, viz. that each of these salaried private tutors, thus designated professors, as a matter of fact teach nothing but popular opinions such as find expression at any mass meeting, &c.

He has no real knowledge about these opinions and desires as to their respective moral value, but labels them all in accordance with the beliefs of the Great Beast, marking as good whatever tickles its fancy and as bad whatever irritates it, whilst any further explanation lies quite beyond him. Reflecting on all this, can you imagine that there will ever be popular acceptance or recognition of the absolute

J xl ἕκαστα ἕσθ' ὅπως πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι ; ἥκιστά γ', ἔφη. φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. *Rep.* 493 B.

good as distinguished from individual good things, or indeed of the absolute in any class of objects? I cannot. A philosophic public, then, must remain an unattainable ideal.'

K The last passages seem to indicate the limits denoted by δόξα. It here covers the whole of the ordinary person's belief about the objects of daily experience, including undigested views on morals, politics, and art. Indeed it can be made the equivalent of our own philosophical term 'Experience,' if we rigorously confine the function of νόησις to ideas in a transcendental [1] sense, which Plato, as we have seen, appears to do. For on this hypothesis, if we ask what Plato would designate the knowledge of phenomena as held by a scientist, supposing the question had any meaning for a Greek of Plato's time, we have no other term but δόξα to give, as can be seen from the simile of the Line in *Rep.* 510 [2]. If, on the other hand, we refuse, in the face of Aristotle's testimony, to ascribe this transcendental character to the εἴδη, and regard them as general concepts in the mind only, i. e. as conceptual, we are then free to make the distinction as follows :— (*a*) Scientific knowledge of Nature, which interprets individual phenomena in the light of universal law, or, as Plato would say, as μιμήματα τῶν εἰδῶν, will be ἐπιστήμη and its organ νόησις; whilst (*b*) Empirical knowledge of Nature, which sees no further than what

[1] The term transcendental is, throughout this compilation, used to imply an existence independent of both phenomena and our thoughts about them.

[2] See, however, below for Dr. Jackson's view.

is present to the senses, will be τὸ δοξαστόν or simply **K**
δόξα—the name also given to its organ. In both cases, however, we are, on the latter view, dealing with phenomena and phenomena alone. Between the two views each student of Plato must decide for himself. At any rate True Opinion can for all practical purposes be as sure a guide as any form of Knowledge. Its weakness is its elusiveness; it easily escapes us. True scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is riveted in the mind by the nexus of causality. We know a thing scientifically, and, not merely empirically when we know its cause, the διότι as well as the ὅτι; when we recognize it (through ἀνάμνησις, see §§ L, M) as an instance of a general uniformity of Nature, or in Platonic language, as a ὁμοίωμα of an ἰδέα, and when we know its necessary antecedents and consequents. It is the presence of this causal link that distinguishes ἐπιστήμη from δόξα. To take an example. A market gardener has correct opinion about the conditions under which his plants are exposed to dew at night, an opinion gained by experience. This is empirical knowledge, ἀληθὴς δόξα. A scientific man can explain to him the cause of the varying conditions: he adds to the gardener's knowledge αἰτίας λογισμός. As Plato says below, the latter has travelled the connecting-road from end to end, whereas the gardener has always been stationary at his own end.

Καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται (sc. οἱ ἀγαθοί), ἂν ὀρθῶς xli
ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς
ὡμολογοῦμεν; ναί. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν

'We were also right in our admission that good rulers will prove useful if they guide our affairs for us rightly, although we seem to have been wrong

K xli μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσι. πῶς δὴ 'ὀρθῶς' λέγεις; ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. εἴ τις εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισσαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο; πάνυ γε. τί δ' εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ' ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο; πάνυ γε. καὶ ἕως γ' ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος· οὐδὲν γάρ.

δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ νῦν δὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής. ἔοικέ γε, ὥστε θαυμάζω, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅ τι δή ποτε πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ ὅ τι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ

in agreeing that only wise men can do this. How wrong? I will tell you. Supposing a man who knew the road to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, were to go there himself and were also to act as guide to others, he would certainly make a satisfactory guide? Certainly. But now supposing some one had a correct opinion as to the proper road, but had never been there and learnt it, I take it that he too would prove quite a satisfactory guide? And as long as he retains his correct opinion as to a matter on which the other man possesses knowledge, he will make no worse a guide, with his right notions but his want of instruction, than his rival who has that instruction.

'True opinion, therefore, so far as regards successful action, is as good a guide as knowledge. And it was this point which we missed in our recent discussion on the nature of Virtue. We there laid it down that knowledge alone produces right conduct, whereas the fact was that true opinion does also. Evidently it does; insomuch that it rather surprises me in that case to see the great superiority

ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. οἶσθα οὖν δι' ὅτι θαυμάζεις ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω ; πάνυ γ' εἰπέ. ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλ- **K** xli
μασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν, ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει· τί οὖν δή ; τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινὸς ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον—οὐ γὰρ παραμένει—δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον. πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστί. τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα ; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστί, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. *Men.* 97 A.

attached to knowledge over true opinion, and the wide distinction made between them. Let me tell you the reason. It is because you have not considered the statues of Daedalus, how they turn runaways unless tied down, although they stay with one when fastened securely. Possession of one of this artist's works is almost worthless if kept loose, as it does not stop, being like a runaway slave ; although when tied down it is most valuable, for they are indeed beautiful works of art. To apply this then to true opinions. As long as they stay, they form a beautiful object, and produce all kinds of good. Unfortunately, their habit is not to stay, but to run off out of a man's mind ; and they are consequently worth little until one has tied them down by causal connexion. When bound, they at once develop into knowledge, and so become permanent. And this it is which gives knowledge a higher value than right opinion, and the distinction between the two lies in the presence or the absence of this connecting-link.'

K People with right opinion only, i. e. empirical knowledge, are at best like blind men whose good fortune alone keeps them to their road.

xlii Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδε λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; οὐδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ' ἃ οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες; οὐδέν, ἔφη. *Rep.* 506 c.

'Does it seem justifiable to talk on a subject of which one has no knowledge as if one had? Most decidedly not, but to be ready to give one's opinions merely as opinions and not as knowledge seems fair enough. You surely though have noticed what an ugly appearance all opinions present that are devoid of scientific knowledge, and that the best of them are blind. For those who entertain true opinions about any matter without an intelligent understanding of it are in the same position as blind men who happen to keep to their road.'

The road itself can only be seen in the light of The Good; the true and full meaning of the world is only realized when transient phenomena are disregarded, and their archetypes alone are studied in their relation to the one supreme *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος*.

xliii Ὅταν δέ γ' οἶμαι ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπῃ, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα (sc. ἡ ὄψις) φαίνεται. τί μήν; οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται,

'When, however, they are turned on to things in the sunlight they see the objects clearly, and the faculty also of sight is then realized in the eyes themselves. So too with the mind. When directed upon any object lying in the light of Truth and Reality it both understands and knows it, and also

ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι. *Rep.* 508 D. K xliii

clearly exercises its faculty of pure intellect. But whenever it considers a subject-matter that is as much dark as light, mere phenomena that come and go, then it can only form short-sighted opinions which assume every conceivable form, and in fact is like a man devoid of all intelligence. Now that which alike constitutes the truth of the objects known, and makes it possible for the subject to know them, I would have you conceive to be the Idea of the Good.'

These passages seem to indicate that no knowledge of phenomena can amount to more than δόξα. Yet if knowledge proper—ἐπιστήμη—deals with Ideas alone, and differs from true opinion—ἀληθὴς δόξα—only by the addition of the causal nexus—αἰτίας δεσμῷ—what are we to say of the knowledge of phenomena as possessed by the scientific mind? On this showing, it can be neither the one nor the other. We may refuse to meet the difficulty by simply denying the possibility of equating the ancient with the modern standpoint, and by holding that the modern reading of phenomena, in the light of experimental truth, is an attitude utterly alien to the Greeks. Failing this, it would seem the only course to hold that we are wrong in separating so sharply the two worlds from each other, τὰ νοητά from τὰ αἰσθητά, and that all that Plato means when he declares that ἐπιστήμη parts with sensibles, and travels in and through ideas alone, is that the idiosyncrasies of individuals are dropped

K and disregarded, and that we think only of the permanent law as represented, *pro hac vice,* in the phenomenon under observation. This of course brings Plato's position on to a level with all modern thought since Bacon, and it is a position that can claim much support from the Dialogues after making due allowance for the *Platonis inconstantia.*

Another view is ably put forward by Dr. Henry Jackson [1]. His reading of the combined similes of the Line and the Cave attributes to Plato a twofold division in knowledge, each with a further subdivision; thus we get—

(1) Sensible objects as they appear to us (εἰκασία).
(2) Sensible objects as they are (πίστις or δόξα).
(3) Scientific knowledge of concepts (λόγοι) in our mind (διάνοια).
(4) Scientific knowledge of ideas in themselves (νόησις).

He thus makes room for the scientific standpoint, and finds it neither in δόξα nor in ἐπιστήμη, but in that aspect of knowledge which is best typified by the mathematical sciences. These, he holds, do not exhaust διάνοια, but the latter term is intended to cover any branch of science in the experimental and provisional stage, which has not as yet proved its generalizations by a completed chain of deductive reasoning from the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος, or which has not shown that its provisional λόγοι of things (i. e. the general notions in the mind) are correct copies of the self-existing εἴδη. And just as the geometrician uses visible objects in his expositions, although thinking of the absolute

[1] See *Journal of Phil.*, 1882 ff.

abstract figures, so science in this stage has still to do with phenomena, and is still engaged on perfecting its λόγοι. It may be added that if this wide range be allowed to διάνοια, then ἐπιστήμη and νόησις remain unattainable ideals, and can only make their appearance at the goal of knowledge when science has become omniscience. For 'the more perfect a science is the more deductive it becomes,' and in the ascent and descent of νόησις Plato seems to have a vision of the course of scientific inquiry as completed, where all inductions are at length exhibited as deductions from superior ἀρχαί, themselves dependent on ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος. K

This view doubtless meets the difficulty of finding a term to denote the progress of science; for, obviously, supposing the Greeks of Plato's day to have held such a conception of progressive physical science, there was needed a word to represent the transitional stage, during which the first rough outlines of the general notion—λόγος—gained by ξυναγωγή and διαίρεσις, were filled in by further knowledge, until they coincided with the content of the eternal transcendental Idea, as known by Omniscience. But it is still a question whether Plato ever held any such conception, seeing that the so-called sciences of his day were limited to pure mathematics, and whether he did not regard it as possible, simply through the logical processes of his dialectic, playing on the *data* already present and known under current general terms, aided also by imagination, to draw up a final scheme of ἐπιστήμη from the First Principle of The Good downwards (cf. xxx).

In the following passage it will be seen there is little room for science as we think of it, and a distinction

K seems to be purposely drawn between the sciences and arts of the day on the one hand, and the mathematical studies on the other, to which the term *διάνοια* is peculiarly attributed.

xliv Τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχείρει μέθοδος ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν (sc. dialectic, or νόησις)· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν (e.g. rhetoric) ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις (manufactures) ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων ἅπασαι τετράφαται· αἱ δὲ λοιπαί, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ ἑπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε συμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ

'On this at least we are all agreed, that in every case of getting at the absolute nature of anything it is quite a distinct method which undertakes the investigation; distinct I mean from the remaining arts and sciences, which are either subservient to the opinions and passions of mankind, or else concerned with production and manufactures, or again with the due preservation of these natural and artificial products. For as to the remainder which we credited with the apprehension of some part of Truth, geometry and such like, we now see that they merely dream about the Real, and can never have a waking vision so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use as fixed *termini a quibus*, without giving an explanation of them. For a study whose devotees begin with an unknown element, and proceed to construct both their middle and end out of this same unknown, may indeed be a sort of Convention, but can in no sense of the word be termed a Science.

ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; οὐδεμία (i. e. mathematics, through not proving their axioms, are provisional only). **K** xliv
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται... συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης· διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα. *Rep.* 533 A.

'Thus the method of Dialectic is unique in the fact that it destroys its hypotheses, and works towards a first principle in order to confirm its provisional results; in which process of conversion it uses the help of the preceding studies; studies which we have habitually called sciences, but which really need another name, something clearer than mere opinion, and yet rather more obscure than science; a name which, as you remember, we have already termed *Διάνοια*.'

This, it will be admitted, is just the sort of passage where one might have expected the distinction in the two stages of science to be duly noted, had they presented themselves to the writer, as it evidently is intended to cover all branches of knowledge in which Plato is interested. But we find no mention of it; and, indeed, if we are to take as serious certain passages in the Dialogues, we might even conclude that Plato had no conception of the uniformity of Nature, and despaired of certain knowledge in any branch of natural philosophy, and that he rated such pursuits far beneath the study of Dialectic. Take e. g. the following kindred passage from what is generally considered one of the later dialogues—The *Philebus*—where the arts and sciences are passed in review and deliberately set on one side, as opposed to Dialectic on the other.

K xlv

Ἆρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι, καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηνται, πρῶτον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι, συντεταμένως ; εἴ τε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν, οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονεν καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου ; φαῖμεν ἂν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς ; οὕτως. οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνῄρηται τὸν πόνον ; ἀληθέστατα. τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὧν μήτε ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ μήθ' ἕξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει ; καὶ πῶς ; περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδ' ἡντινοῦν πῶς ἄν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ; οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἐστιν τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα. *Phil.* 58 E.

'Your present remark is apparently prompted by your having noticed that all the other arts and sciences, along with those who study them, appeal merely to the opinions of mankind, and strenuously investigate the complexity of these. And if, further than this, any one imagines himself to be a student of nature, you are aware that after all it is only about the present order of the universe, its properties and its actions, that he devotes his lifelong study; and all his labour is undertaken, not on behalf of timeless reality, but only about transient phenomena, their present state, their antecedents, and their consequents. Most true. How then could we admit the possibility of the highest kind of truth in any part of such a field, where nothing has ever had uniformity, or ever will have, or has so now? Impossible. With such a subject-matter, therefore, devoid of every particle of certainty, we shall in vain expect any certain knowledge in our own mind; and we must conclude that intellect proper is not concerned with such, and that there can be no science of it in the strictest sense of the word.'

Such passages as these, which could be easily multiplied, representing, as they do, Plato's habitual attitude towards the study of Nature as we conceive of it, do not suggest the allocation to such a study of a relatively high faculty like *Διάνοια*. For the subject-matter of the latter is certainly *τὸ ὄν*, as opposed to *τὸ γιγνόμενον*, and of geometry, one of its branches, it is said *τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσίς ἐστιν*. Conformably to this, *διάνοια* is often included under *νόησις*, in the wider sense of the latter term; and of the two thus united we read *δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν εἶναι*. Surely it is difficult, therefore, to believe that the term *διάνοια* is applicable to the state of mind of the scientist who is still seeking, through phenomena, his way to ultimate truth, but who has not yet attained it, as Dr. Jackson would have us believe. **K**

VI. ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΙΣ—INNATE IDEAS

To return once more to our critical analysis of Sensation. We have seen (C, D) that in the most elementary form of Consciousness or cognition there is implied Judgement of some kind, even though it be limited to a mere 'this is' or 'this (sensation or feeling) is other than that.' For it seems to be the truth that sensations are not simply 'given' to a recipient that is altogether passive. There is needed as well an active principle of permanent energy, capable of contrasting its feelings—a principle which psychology tends to identify with a rudimentary form of Will[1]. Hence such **L**

[1] Höffding, *Outlines*, IV. 7.

L general categories as 'existence,' 'identity,' 'difference,' 'number,' 'equality,' &c., are the presuppositions of all knowledge, and are logically prior to experience. But though prior in this sense, does it follow that they are prior in any other sense, prior i. e. in time? Are we to hold that they are developed along with experience or that they are ready-made innate ideas? On the one hand, unless consciousness, ἡ ψυχή, or whatever name we choose to give to the living principle of 'synthetic unity' in man, were capable of such distinctions, knowledge would be unthinkable; on the other hand, they themselves are unintelligible except as applied to experience. Now it would appear that Plato tried to give them a priority in time, one proof adduced being the well-known catechizing of the Slave in *Meno* 82 ff., though, indeed, it might be objected that that illustration proved precisely the contrary, viz. that such ideas far from being innate, are only developed through concrete experience. Plato's line of argument is drawn from the consideration of the act of sense-perception. Sensible objects generate in our mind, he says, more than the perception of their own qualities. Along with the perception of these latter there goes the conception of an ideal, to which they only approximate and which they represent. Take the idea of equality. If we ask a four-year-old child whether two peas are like each other, he answers 'yes'; but when pressed as to whether they are '*exactly*' alike he readily admits that that is not so, and ultimately you get him to confess that no two things can be perfectly equal, although all the time he knows the meaning of equality. The 'idea' therefore of equality must, argues Plato, have been pre-existent,

though doubtless latent, in his mind, and is 'remembered' by him on the application of the necessary stimulus. Thus we get the doctrine of *Ἀνάμνησις*. L

Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῶν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα. σκόπει δὴ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι,—αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; φῶμεν μέντοι, νὴ Δί' ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς γε. ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; (i. e. the idea, though in one sense transcendental and independent of experience, is, for us, only developed from and applicable to experience). ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε, ταὐτὰ ὄντα, τότε μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται τότε δ' οὔ (cf. xiii); τί δέ; xlvi

'This follows also from the doctrine so often preached by you,—assuming of course its truth,—that the growth of our experience is simply a case of recollection. Consider the validity of the following argument. We are accustomed, I take it, to speak of equality—not, I mean, that between a couple of sticks or stones, but something additional to all this, viz. abstract equality. Are we to believe it so or not? Most assuredly we are, and with all our strength. It is, I assume, a piece of knowledge; but where did we get the conception of it, unless from the objects just mentioned, through our seeing equal sticks, stones, &c., and so forming an idea of it as something different from these;—since of course you admit it is different. And look at it this way. The same sticks or stones alternately appear as equal and unequal (according i. e. to the point of comparison); but abstract equals were

L xlvi αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη ; ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης ; (cf. xlix) οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας ; ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου ; πάνυ γε. ἕως ἂν ἄλλο (individ.) ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο (gen.) ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι.

Phaed. 72–4.

never surely seen as unequals, or equality as inequality. There must then be a difference between such pairs of material equals and the general idea of equality. And yet it was from these same concrete equals that we derived the quite distinct conception of that abstract equality. And whether this conception be similar or dissimilar to its derivatives, as long as a person by looking at one object forms from it what is quite a separate idea, such a process must necessarily be a case of remembrance.'

The general idea too is the perfect archetype—*παράδειγμα*—to which individuals only approximate (see later, § T).

xlvii Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτ' εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι

'We must therefore have had the conception of equality previous to the time when the sight of equal objects first suggested to us the thought that, while all such make a bid for absolute equality, they always fall short of it. And yet we are also agreed that it was only through the exercise of sight or touch or some other sense that we became

ἐννοῆσαι (a very strong statement as to their derivative character on the one side) ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων. (Yet on the other side) ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται—τοῦ ὅ ἔστιν ἴσον—καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν. πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, ὅ τι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. *Id.* 74 E–75. **L** xlvii

conscious of the idea, or indeed that we can do so: although, on the other hand, the necessary result of such exercise of the senses is the conviction that sensible objects but approximate to absolute equality. It follows, therefore, that prior to any act of sight or hearing, &c., on our part, we must have acquired the knowledge and conception of abstract equality, if i. e. we were to institute a comparison between it and phenomena, and to notice how the latter endeavour, but endeavour in vain, to reach the level of the former.'

But it is not only of such wide concepts as 'equality' that we regain through sense-perception ἀνάμνησις of a pre-natal knowledge, lost at the moment of birth: the doctrine is logically extended over the whole field of knowledge proper, or that dealing in universals (ἐπιστήμη) which thus becomes the intuitive recognition of the 'idea' by the means of contact with sensible phenomena.

Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζό- xlviii

'The argument applies in no way any more to equality than to absolute beauty or goodness, justice or purity, and, in a word, to everything we

L xlviii

μεθα τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν εἶναι τούτων ἁπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. ἔστι ταῦτα. εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἆρ' οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν 'μανθάνειν' οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη ; ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν 'μανθάνειν' οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. *Phaed.* 75 c.

can stamp with the notion of existence in itself: and consequently in all such conceptions we must have acquired pre-natal knowledge. But this means that, if this acquired knowledge before birth was lost at the moment of birth, and afterwards recovered in its previous form by the exercise of our sense-organs, the so-called learning for oneself is simply a process of recovery. Either. then, we are born with knowledge, and it is the lifelong possession of all alike, or else those described as "learning" are really remembering, and the operation is one of recollection.'

For a criticism of the doctrines of innate ideas, at least in its more shameless form, the reader may be referred to the opening chapters of Locke's *Essay* (Book i. chs. 2–4); the gist of which is that if one idea is innate then all must be so, and that their 'recollection,' in order to be fairly considered such, must be so recognized by us at the time, i. e. we must be conscious that we once had the knowledge of them before. The English philosopher sees no more in the doctrine than the bare recognition that in order to know we must have the capacity of knowing—*δυνάμει πως ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς*. Perhaps if we substitute for a pre-existent state 'the accumulated effects of

heredity upon the convolutions of the brain' we make **L** the theory more palatable in the present age.

It may, however, be worth while to point out that **M** Plato means us to take the doctrine of 'Ανάμνησις quite seriously, and we shall do him an injustice as a philosopher if we attribute it either to his poetic imagination or to the influence of Pythagorean eschatology. On the contrary, it forms an integral part of his whole theory of knowledge. As sceptical as any of his opponents as to the possibility of truth or knowledge in the physical sciences, he, as we have seen, fell back for support upon an immaterial, ideal, and transcendental world, where things existed as they are in themselves, and which is composed of single inter-related archetypes that represent the reality of the scattered imitations found in phenomena. That to him is the real, and knowledge of this can alone be accounted such. The difficulty was to bridge the two worlds, a difficulty of which the stupendous proportions were perfectly familiar to himself, as we shall see in considering the *Parmenides*. It is, indeed, the old difficulty of dualism, only under another form. For on the assumption that matter and spirit are two distinct forces, the attempt of to-day to account either for the production of one from the other or the knowledge of the one by the other, is not a whit less hopeless than Plato's strenuous efforts to connect the phenomenal with his ideal and pre-natal world. The same fatal distinction, when made by the Greeks, brought about the same *impasse* in thought. Matter was given an independent nature and existence, and the true antithesis of subject and object was represented as one between mind and matter. Plato, seeing the flux of

M τὰ *αἰσθητά*, felt, and felt rightly, that truth must be sought through general concepts and propositions, and, further, must be spiritual, the ordered possession of a thinking subject. Therefore he made haste to escape from phenomena and the contradictions and defects of the senses, and to take refuge in the world of thought, which he first constructed out of his own growing experience, obtained through the senses, and then endowed with a superior and independent existence, because, as he assumed, the world of sense was not the world of thought, but something quite different both in origin and nature, having as its substratum an unbending *ὕλη*, which was the very antithesis of *νοῦς*. On his principles Plato could act no otherwise than he did. The creation of his ideal world represented his effort to escape from dualism into monism, where all should be spirit. A more spiritual interpretation of nature would have rendered unnecessary what at first sight seems so gratuitous a fancy, but what was in fact the inevitable consequence of his own premises. Having thus placed his world of knowledge, not in a systematized body of thought of which the knowing subject and the known object are but two aspects of the same piece of spiritual reality, but in a non-phenomenal world that represented apparently an object divorced from a subject, Plato had then to show how, if Truth were there, the human mind could attain to it. As like is only known by like, knowledge of the *εἴδη* could only be possible for the soul when moving in the same sphere, i. e. in a pre-phenomenal and pre-natal existence. The difficulties of this task he was in no danger of minimizing, as we now proceed to find.

VII. DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSCENDENTALISM

WE have seen (xx) that ideas are coextensive with general terms, and that they are developed by abstraction from individuals—*ξυναγωγή*. We have also seen a decided tendency to regard them as forming an intelligible world by themselves, existing from all eternity independently of our conception of them through experience, in other words to give them a 'transcendental' character. If the latter view be accepted, a question at once arises, as to what limits we are to set to the extension of these eternal *ἰδέαι*. E. g. are there transcendental forms or ideas not merely of supreme ethical attributes such as *τὸ καλόν*, *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, &c., or again of the widest intellectual determinations such as *τὸ ἴσον*, *ταὐτόν*, *τὸ ἕτερον*, or finally of all the physical products of Nature in the organic and inorganic worlds, which look so like fixed types, but also of all the relations and aspects under which these can be regarded? The human mind may cling to the conviction that there must be something absolute corresponding to our ideas of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, and it is a natural explanation of the universe to regard it as created in the likeness of an eternal and heavenly pattern: but inasmuch as all these things are objects of knowledge, and the recognition of the underlying 'idea,' if such there be, is only possible through experience, there seems no reason, if we are to be logical, why we should refuse to admit an eternal, **N**

N self-existing 'idea' as the counterpart of any thought or notion that the human mind is capable of. We shall thus be giving a transcendental existence to the content of every connotative term that finds or has found a place in every language ever spoken or to be spoken by a human tongue[1]. E. g. we have a definite idea of what we mean by the term 'Quixotic.' Has it therefore an existence *ἐν τόπῳ οὐρανίῳ*? Again, much knowledge deals, not with universals, but with individual and unique persons and things. Are there ideas of such, or how are we to draw the line? This difficulty was well known to Plato and his followers, although he gives no certain answer to it.

xlix *Καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἓν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες; ἔμοιγε. ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος—αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό—καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων; ναί. τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος; ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλάκις δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι*

'Did you make this distinction yourself, I mean that between certain absolute ideas on the one hand, and phenomena that partake of them on the other, so that you really believe in the existence of absolute "likeness" apart from such likeness as we ourselves share in, and, in a word, in all the other conceptions which Zeno has mentioned? Certainly. Including an absolute idea of Justice, Beauty, Goodness, &c.? Yes. And an idea of man, over and above the sum of human beings—the absolute idea of man—or again of fire or water? These, Parmenides, have often caused me to hesitate whether I ought to class them

[1] Cf. Locke's criticism of Innate Ideas.

ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως. ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκ., N
ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ xlix
ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς
εἴτε χρὴ φάναι εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, εἴτε καὶ μή; οὐδαμῶς,
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε, ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι. εἶδος
δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἦ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι
ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μή τι ᾖ περὶ πάντων ταὐτόν. νέος γὰρ
εἶ ἔτι, ὦ Σώκ., καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς
ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις.
Parm. 130 B.

with those other concepts. And how about things that look rather ridiculous, such as hair, mud, filth, or any other worthless and insignificant object, are you undecided whether to hold the existence of an idea for each of these? Oh dear, no! but in their case their real nature is just what we see it, for I fancy that the supposition of any absolute idea for them would be the height of absurdity. And yet I am worried at times whether the same be not true of these also. Ah! Socrates, you are still a beginner, and philosophy has not yet laid hold of you as in my belief it will one day, when you will regard nothing as unimportant.'

On the other hand we have in the *Rep.* the 'idea' of an art-product.

Ἀλλ' ὅρα δή, καὶ τόνδε τινὰ καλεῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν; τὸν l
ποιόν; ὃς πάντα ποιεῖ . . . καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα
καὶ ζῷα πάντα ἐργάζεται τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν κ.τ.λ. οὐκοῦν
τριτταί τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίγνονται· μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει
οὖσα, ἣν φαῖμεν ἂν θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι κ.τ.λ. *Rep.* 596–7.

'But you would also call a creator this sort of being? What sort? One who makes everything—all products of the soil and all living things, himself included, &c. . . . Thus we get three distinct beds; the first that which exists in the eternal scheme of things, which we should attribute to the work of God, &c.'

N Again in the *Tim.* we seem to have ideas of certainly all the elemental στοιχεῖα of which the physical universe is compounded.

li Ἆρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ πάντα περὶ ὧν ἀεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ἕκαστα ὄντα, ἢ ταῦτα ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, μόνα ἐστὶ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ἀλήθειαν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μάτην ἑκάστοτε εἶναί τί φαμεν εἶδος ἑκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος ; *Tim.* 51.

'Is there an absolute existence of fire and all other objects of which we constantly speak of the things as existing in themselves; or are we to hold that physical objects as perceived by sight and other senses are the only sources of permanent truth, and beyond them there is not a vestige of reality, so that it is merely idle talk to speak of the existence of a spiritual form of each class of phenomena, instead of regarding it, as we should, simply as a mental concept?'

This latter aspect, which we might reasonably regard as going far enough, and as an adequate basis for scientific construction, is, as we have seen, rejected by Plato. The material world for him is an imperfect creation, and does not represent the true order of thought. It has the inherent limitations of dualism, and is only a defective copy—ὁμοίωμα—of the real system of self-existent and eternal types.

Modern science, on the other hand, gladly recognizes the conceptual character of the ἰδέαι. They are general concepts, formed by the mind from experience and held there for the sake of reasoning. Nature exhibits 'laws,' which are only expressed in general propositions and are apprehended purely by the intellect, i. e. which are νοητά; but these hold good

only because the changing things of sense conform to them, and apart from phenomena they have no εἶναι. We know e.g. that 'A' is always followed by 'B,' although in nature 'A' may be constantly changing into 'C.' N

Plato however proceeds—

Ὧδε τήν γ' ἐμὴν τίθεμαι ψῆφον αὐτός· εἰ μὲν νοῦς (=νόησις of *Rep.* 511) καὶ δόξα ἀληθὴς ἐστον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὑτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν, εἴδη νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ', ὥς τισι φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθὴς νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ' ὁπόσα ἂν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανώμεθα, θετέον βεβαιότατα. δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ' ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δε ἄλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ὁμολογητέον (A) ἓν lii

'Personally I support this view. If true opinion and scientific knowledge are two distinct states of mind, then these absolute forms inevitably exist, imperceptible to our senses and held only by the intellect as ideas. If however, as some think, there is no difference between the two, then we must attribute the very highest degree of truth to whatever we have sense-perception of through the human body. Twofold, however, they must be considered, since they differ both in their source and in their characteristics. For, whilst the one is begotten by instruction, the other is the effect of persuasion; the first is always accompanied by a true process of reasoning, the second is unreasoned; again the one is proof against persuasion, whilst the other can be changed by it; and, finally, whilst we must allow a share of right opinion to every man, we retain true knowledge for the gods and a select body of mankind. We accordingly have to recognize (A) on

N lii *μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ εἶδος ἔχον, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποι ἰόν, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναίσθητον, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν·* (B) *τὸ δ' ὁμώνυμον ὅμοιόν τε ἐκείνῳ δεύτερον, αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν, πεφορημένον ἀεί, γιγνόμενόν τε ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύμενον, δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν.* *Id.*

the one hand the absolute self-identical idea, without beginning or end, which never admits into itself any other alien notion nor ever enters itself into any other, invisible and otherwise imperceptible by sense, being in short that which it is the function of pure intellect to consider. And (B) secondly we have that which is synonymous and similar to the above, perceptible by sense, created, always in motion, appearing in some part of space and again disappearing—the subject-matter of opinion and present sensation.'

O This passage should be compared with those already quoted in illustration of Δόξα. It is not always easy to follow Plato's thought where he is laying down the respective limits of true opinion and of knowledge; the main difficulty being due to the marked difference between our conception of scientific knowledge and his own, and also to the far wider field that the various branches of research have opened up to us since his day. But one thing seems clear, and that is that δόξα with him is always of individual facts, the unconnected πολλά of experience, originating either in actual present sense-perception of an object, or in the recollection of such by memory and imagination. Knowledge, or ἐπιστήμη, on the other hand, is essentially general, and deals in universals, and, we might almost add, in universals alone. Now in the

above passage Plato is pleading for the transcendental existence of his Ideas on the ground of the fundamental distinction between true opinion and knowledge. This distinction is not always self-evident to us. It might be urged that opinion is relative to degrees of certainty in our mind, and that wherever it is more than accidentally true it ceases to be opinion and becomes knowledge. 'True opinion' in other words is a contradiction in terms[1]. But the answer would seem to be that it is precisely this accidental quality about true opinion that differentiates it for Plato from knowledge proper. Both here and in the *Theaetetus* he lays much stress upon the peculiar forces which go to generate true opinion, which is often due merely to persuasive pleading and brilliant oratory. (Cf. *Theaet.* 201 A–C.) Here he further points out the want of equilibrium in such a basis; since what has been established by one pleader can equally well be overturned by another. As the *Meno* puts it, true opinions are so apt to run away and to change into something else, which is not the case where the individual is known as a representative of uniform law, or at least where the law itself, or indeed any true universal judgement, is held in the mind by the compelling bond of causal connexion with another similar law or judgement.

The applicability of any form of knowledge, whether *νόησις* or *διάνοια*, to phenomena has already been discussed, and we have seen that the evidence points to the conclusion that Plato refused both alike to any study of what we mean by natural science. We can hardly, therefore, say that Plato sees the law *in*

[1] See Jowett, Introduction to *Theaet.*

O phenomena, but that through phenomena he gains, or rather regains (by *Ἀνάμνησις*) knowledge of the law that transcends phenomena. Hence his twofold distinction of general knowledge and empirical knowledge is one not between two ways of looking at phenomena, viz. the scientific and the unscientific, but between phenomena and something other than phenomena, of which phenomena are but imperfect copies. And so, by presenting the antithesis in this peculiar form, he is enabled, by an appeal to the fundamental difference between *ἀληθὴς δόξα* and *νοῦς* as he conceived of them, to argue to the existence of an ideal world distinct from the phenomenal.

P Taking, however, the two worlds thus contrasted, and giving the widest possible field to the 'ideas,' how are we to represent the connexion between the two, between ideas and phenomena, *τὰ νοητά* and *τὰ αἰσθητά*? And here we must guard against a possible misunderstanding. If we regard the *ἰδέαι* as transcendental, then the present question is as to the relation between these suprasensible, eternal entities of divine thought and sensible objects which are continually being made in their likeness. In other words the problem is not so much an epistemological problem, dealing with the processes of human knowledge, as a cosmological or ontological. If, on the other hand, the ideas are what we call general concepts, existing only in our own minds, then the problem is far simpler and becomes purely psychological, viz. the investigation of the so-called 'abstraction' of common qualities, and the connexion between this assumed general idea and the particulars of sense. And yet the two aspects cannot be held apart. For the theory

of ideas is not only a theory of the real but a theory also of knowledge; and in spite of the inherent difficulties urged, as we shall see, by Parmenides against the possibility of connexion between the human mind and any form of the absolute, Plato's ideal creation would have remained but a pleasant fancy, not worth the studied labour and repeated insistence that he gives it, unless the ideas constituted also a knowable real. It is only as representing, not merely the true, but also the attainable object of human inquiry, that they have a permanent place in his system or any interest for ourselves. To him phenomena may veil the truth, but in veiling it they also reveal it, and his ideal world is simply the embodiment of the sum-total of positive and generalized knowledge drawn from every branch of human investigation, systematically formulated, rightly and duly graduated, and finally unified in the unity of a First Cause. P

Even then, if we do not find the ideas in sensibles, it is at least only through sensibles that they can be discovered, or rather we should say 'recovered' by means of Ἀνάμνησις. Recovered, however, they certainly can be. Thus the ontological problem of the relation between phenomena and ideas is only another side of the epistemological problem of how we win our way to the knowledge of the εἴδη, and of the relation between the concepts thus reconstructed by the mind on the one side, and the materials from which they are formed on the other. Regarding then the ἰδέαι as transcendental, we find the problem thus stated:—

P liii *Ὅταν τις ἕνα 'ἄνθρωπον' ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ 'βοῦν' καὶ 'τὸ καλὸν' ἓν καὶ 'τὸ ἀγαθὸν' ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ γίγνεται. πῶς; πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην; μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτ' ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι.* *Phil.* 15 A.

'It is when the attempt is made to posit the existence of a single ideal "man" or "ox," "beauty" or "goodness," that all the pother arises about all such monads. Firstly, whether there is any ground for believing in their absolute existence at all; secondly again how each one of them being single and eternally self-identical and incapable of origination or creation, still remains firmly established as one; and thirdly whether we must conceive of the single idea as extended through the infinity of phenomena and thereby transformed into multiplicity, or think of the whole of it as outside itself. This last course would seem the most impossible of all, viz. that one identical thing should simultaneously be found in a single unit and in a number.'

Q To deal first with the last of these difficulties, viz. the relation between ideas and phenomena. This relation is variously expressed by Plato, and in what are generally considered his earlier and his middle dialogues, notably the *Phaedo*, it is most frequently described as participation—*μετέχειν*. This too seems to be intended in the last-quoted passage, and it is the conception which is subjected to the criticism of Parmenides, who has no difficulty in showing that

the two possible modes of participation, where either (i) the whole, or (ii) part only of the Idea is present in each corresponding phenomenon, are equally unintelligible. Q

liv (i) Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν, ἓν ὄν; τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.

(ii) Μεριστὰ ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται οὕτω γε. ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσεις φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται; οὐδαμῶς. *Parm.* 131 A.

(i) Is it your doctrine that the totality of the idea is present in each individual, single though it be? Why not? Then, whilst remaining a self-identical unit, it will at the same time exist in a number of separate individuals, with the result that it would be outside itself.

(ii) The ideas themselves then are divisible, and phenomena which participate in them will participate in part, and we no longer have the totality of the idea in the individual but only a part. It looks so. Are you really prepared to say, Socrates, that we can actually divide up the single idea and yet that it will remain single? No, I am not.

But the problem of 'participation' is not the only difficulty in the ideal theory. The very unity of the idea is impugned by Parmenides, on grounds partly logical, partly psychological. As we have seen, though transcendental, the ideas are only known by us through intuition of sense in our progressive experience of phenomena. Socrates readily admits that the general concept, representing in our mind the idea that is independent of it, is formed by comparison and abstraction. R

R But, urges his critic, if this is so, then the general idea will itself next be compared with the individuals of sense which generated it, and the result of the comparison will be a *tertium quid*, representative of both. This in its turn is compared with all the preceding, i. e. both with the individuals and with the two previously formed ideas, the result being Idea No. 3, and the process being repeated to infinity. This criticism is known as that of the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.

lv Τί δὲ δή; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις; τὸ ποῖον; οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι. ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τὶ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἕν τι αὖ μέγα φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; ἔοικεν. ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται·

'What, however, do you say to this? I think your belief in the existence of single absolute ideas arises as follows. In judging that a certain number of individual objects are all great, there seems to be present one and the same idea as you look at them all, and hence your opinion that greatness exists as a unit. Quite true. But now if likewise you mentally review this absolute greatness along with the remaining individual great things, will not there appear once more a single "greatness," which constitutes the greatness of all these separate "greats"? A second idea of greatness therefore will appear on the scene, over and above the absolute greatness first formed and its participating individuals. And so again, in addition to all that we already have, we shall get still another, in virtue of which these will be all great; and, consequently, instead of

καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἓν ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. *Parm.* 131 E. R lv

your ideas each being single, you will have an infinity of each.

This objection was always rated very high in antiquity, and Aristotle speaks of it as conclusive. And, indeed, as against the transcendental character of the εἴδη, it may be at once admitted as final; the truth being that we cannot conceive of such absolute existences except under conditions which virtually individualize them and so bring them into line with phenomena themselves. But it is otherwise when the ideas are regarded as only conceptual, and the objection then becomes an instance of that illogical logic of which the Greeks were sometimes the unconscious victims. For it rests on no valid psychological basis, as the mind does not go through this endless process of abstracting from abstractions. Moreover the criticism depends upon a confusion between conception and imagination. A general idea, from its very nature, cannot be represented in individual lineaments, capable of being compared with the sensible phenomena which begat it. It is not a picture held before the imagination on the retina of the mind's eye, for were it so it would cease to be general, and *ipso facto* become particular. It is a purely intellectual product, incapable of description except in other general terms, and has nothing of sense about it, even of 'decaying sense.' I have a general idea say of 'horse,' obtained, not indeed by an act of conscious and deliberate abstraction from all the horses of my acquaintance, but through the gradual growth of my experience, and it consists of the agree-

R ment with myself as to the limits and standard of certain qualities I require in any object claiming that name. It is therefore essentially indefinite: and the measure of its indefiniteness is just the definiteness which we exact in any of the sensible individuals that 'partake' of it. How then can I compare it with the latter, when it is equally all and none of them? The point, however, need not be laboured; it is sufficient merely to point out the fanciful character of the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* argument as applied to conceptualism.

S Faced by the difficulties of *μέθεξις*, Socrates shifts his ground, and is willing to give up the transcendental character of the *εἴδη*, and to take refuge in conceptualism pure and simple. Why should the ideas not be merely *universalia in mente*?

lvi Ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἕν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο. τί οὖν; ἓν ἑκάστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ τινός; ναί. ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; ὄντος. οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ. μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; ναί. εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ

'Well, then, Parmenides, supposing each Idea is simply the mental concept of our classes of objects and is restricted to an existence in our own minds. This view would at least preserve their unity, and they would so escape your previous strictures. But, Socrates, see; is each of the concepts a single unit and yet a concept of nothing? No, that is impossible. It is of something? Yes. Existing or not existing? Existing. Is it not of that single unity which the aforesaid mental concept conceives as belonging to all the individuals, as a single definite form? It is. Then this form which is conceived

S lvi

νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ; ἀνάγκη. τί δὲ δή ; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ᾗ τἆλλα φῂς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι ; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔχει λόγον.

Parm. 132 B.

as being one will be the idea, always identical in all ; and the same necessity which makes you speak of individuals partaking in the ideas, will also force you upon the following dilemma. Either you must hold each individual object to be made up of general thoughts, so that everything will be endowed with thought, or else regard them as thoughts and yet as incapable of thought.'

Here we have the *crux* of the whole matter, viz. the nature of a general idea. The chief difficulty of the passage arises from the defective holding of the balance between subject and object. Socrates overstates the subjective side when he declares that the ideas exist *only* in the mind[1], leaving Parmenides to remind him that the concept must have a corresponding object, which is in fact the common attributes of all the individuals of the class. But when he proceeds to his dilemma, and argues that the individuals must actually be composed of these general or abstract ideas, he is, no doubt, taking Socrates at his word, but is at the same time laying himself open to the charge of neglecting the same distinction. He shows that, strictly interpreted, Socrates' new position leads to an identification of things with thoughts, if i. e. the former be regarded as participating in the latter ; but he scarcely shows that individual things cannot 'partake' of the general idea, when the correlation of subject and object is firmly held.

[1] Cf. Grote, *ad loc.*

S Before passing on we may notice that the dilemma of Parmenides, both horns of which Socrates recognizes as absurdities, has been accepted, though in a different form, by modern idealists. Things may be thoughts, though indeed not our thoughts. For the difficulty of conceiving the existence of an object apart from a subject naturally leads to the recognition of 'things' as the objects of thought to an eternal Subject, a view represented in England amongst others by the late T. H. Green [1].

T With conceptualism faring no better, it would seem, than the doctrine of 'participation,' Socrates brings forward his last presentation of the matter, and claims for the εἴδη the character of eternal archetypes to which phenomena are likened. In other words Μίμησις takes the place of μέθεξις. This mode of representing the relation bêtween the two worlds is often employed by Plato up and down the Dialogues, although the tendency to-day is to believe that it is more characteristic of the later, i. e. of those subsequent to the *Parmenides*. On the other hand it is not confined to these, even if the current chronology be accepted. It certainly occurs in the last book of the *Republic* (596 ff.), and appears to be implied in the following passage of the *Phaedo*, although here doubtless μέθεξις is given the priority of place.

lvii Φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει

'My own view is that whatever things beautiful there may be besides absolute beauty the sole reason of their beauty is their participation in that

[1] Cf. the first part of *Proleg. to Ethics*.

T lvii

ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ διότι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, τοῦτο ἁπλῶς ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι (viz. the best expression for the relation between idea and phenomenon), ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι. καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ. *Phaed.* 100 C.

absolute beauty. And so with all other things. If any man gives me a reason for a thing being beautiful I simply hold to my own conviction that what renders it beautiful is nothing but the presence, or association, or whatever other way you represent it, of that absolute beauty. This last point I no longer contend over, but at least I maintain that it is through beauty that beautiful things become beautiful, since that view seems to me established. And you might vociferate with all your might that you know of no other way in which phenomena arise than through participation in their own real natures.'

To Parmenides Socrates formulates the new version as follows :—

lviii

Ἀλλὰ μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν. τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. *Parm.* 132 D.

'Well, then, my favourite mode of representing it is like this. These ideas form, as it were, permanent archetypes in the universe of which sensible phenomena are likenesses, and the participation of the latter in the ideas is simply the being made in their likeness.'

T This theory of archetypes is developed in the physical treatise of the *Timaeus*, where the processes of *γένεσις*—Nature—are explained as the ceaseless impressions by the *Δημιουργός* of the *παραδείγματα* upon formless matter, thus producing phenomena as we know them, which are therefore *μιμήματα*. Parmenides, however, will not accept this mode of representing the *εἴδη* any more than the others.

lix Εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικε τῷ εἴδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι ; οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ [εἴδους] μετέχειν ; ἀνάγκη. οὗ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ᾖ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον. *Id., l. c.*

'If then any individual object resembles the archetypal idea, it must follow that the one is similar to the other, and when you get two similars they must inevitably both participate in something common to both. Certainly. But, surely, that by virtue of participation in which the two similars are similar will be the absolute idea. It follows then that phenomena are precluded from similarity with the idea, and the idea with them, for otherwise there will always be making its appearance a further idea over and above the first; whilst if this, in its turn, resembles aught in the phenomena, we shall have still another, and so the formation of fresh *εἴδη* will go on for ever.'

This is the old argument of the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, and if we regard the ideal archetypes as transcendental units (*χωριστά*), the criticism is just enough. It may, however, be better to admit once for all that Plato is

now moving in regions where it is impossible for human reason to exist, and that any terms expressive of finite thought or action become altogether inadequate and misleading when applied to the divine activities of the world's creator. T

This reflection leads to the last and greatest stumbling-block in the way of the acceptance of the doctrine of ideas. If they are transcendental they are *ipso verbo* superhuman. We can say nothing about the relation of the ἰδέαι either to phenomena or to one another. The ideal world is like Kant's 'things in themselves,' of which we, limited as we are to our own mental categories, can consequently know nothing, for knowledge of them implies their presence in our minds, whereupon they cease to be absolute. This is the fundamental difficulty that awaits every attempt to find Reality and Knowledge away from phenomena. For human faculties must ever remain the measure of human knowledge, and whatever does not conform to the laws of human thought must necessarily lie outside. With this wide interpretation of the words we have all to recognize the Protagorean dictum πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. U

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐάν τις ὡς εἴδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διορίζηται; καὶ μάλα. εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἅπτει αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἓν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφοριζό- lx

'You now see, Socrates, the sort of difficulties that beset the theory of absolute ideas, and yet at present you are not, one might say, even on the fringe of the difficulty, if you persist in always constructing a single idea for every class of sensible objects and giving it absolute existence. Listen

U lx

μενος θήσεις. πῶς δή; πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε· εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκεσθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται. πῇ δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη; ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ' αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὑτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται (e. g. μιμήματα), ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα. τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις, αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὑτά ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτω. *Parm.* 133 A.

then to the greatest difficulty of all. If one were to maintain that the very characteristics which we are forced to attribute to them actually put them beyond our knowledge, he could not be gainsaid. For I take it that you or anybody else who believes in an absolute essence of each class, would admit first of all that none of them is in our own minds. Most certainly, for how otherwise could it be absolute? It follows then that all the relations which obtain between the ideas represent a reality relative to themselves, participation in which gives us our various names, and not to our mundane objects—whether we call them likenesses or what not. Similarly objects in our world, synonymous with the ideas, likewise have relations between themselves and not with the ideas, and all the names given are in respect to the former objects and not to the latter.'

The two worlds are *χωριστά* and cannot be bridged, so that human knowledge must remain out of all relation with divine, and *vice versa*.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστημη, τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη ; πάνυ γε. ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη ; ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν. ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν. κινδυνεύει. *Id.* 134 A. U lxi

'Absolute knowledge then will be of absolute truth, and our human knowledge will likewise be of our human relative truth. And as you admit that the absolute ideas are not and cannot be within our own minds, it follows that no idea is ever known by us, inasmuch as we are precluded from absolute knowledge. Absolute beauty, therefore, and absolute goodness, and all that we conceive of us as real essential forms, remain unknowable by ourselves.'

And by similar reasoning:—

Εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε lxii

'Then, if this absolute lordship and this absolute knowledge are found with God, that absolute lordship of lords absolute could never exercise lordship over us, nor could that absolute knowledge ever know us or anything amongst us. Similarly we do not rule over the absolute slaves with our human rule, nor with our human knowledge do we know anything of all of the divine world, and by parity of reasoning those absolute masters cannot

U lxii γιγνώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες (a *reductio ad absurdum*). *Id.* 134 D.

be masters over us, nor can they, owing to their divine nature, have any knowledge of human affairs.'

Such are the consequences of despiritualizing Nature and of leaving the firm foothold of phenomena. At best it is to exchange the partially known for the wholly unknowable.

To sum up :—

lxiii Ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα. συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις.

Id. 135 A.

'These, and many more than these are the difficulties, Socrates, which beset the doctrine of Ideas if there really exist these transcendental forms, and if a man will uphold the absolute in every class of phenomena. They indeed justify the objector who not only denies their existence but also declares that, let them exist ever so much, they must still remain outside the range of human nature. I quite agree with you, for your arguments fully approve themselves to my judgement.'

V Rarely has a great thinker looked his own philosophical speculations so honestly in the face as Plato has done in the *Parmenides*, and seldom, if ever, has he contrived to adhere to views after such trenchant destructive criticism levelled and successfully levelled

against them. That Plato is in earnest in this dialogue can scarcely admit of doubt, though the fact that he held on to his theory, in spite of the rough treatment it here encounters, has led to various devices on the part of critics to weaken the significance of the work, including even the denial of its authenticity. A solution of the difficulty may perhaps be sought in the consideration of the Zenonian treatment of hypotheses, which this dialogue also discloses. Every hypothesis, said the Eleatic, should be discussed on its negative side equally with the positive, and the consequences investigated, not merely of affirming a theory, but also of denying it. Accordingly, whatever may be the difficulties of believing in the Ideas, those of not believing in them seem to Plato even more momentous and disastrous. And, therefore, although the arguments purposely put by Plato into the mouth of Parmenides remained unanswered by him, he still continued to hold the transcendental existence of εἴδη and their recognition by us in sense-perception through Ἀνάμνησις; for the denial of ideas in some form or other meant general scepticism. V

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ lxiv

'And yet, said Parmenides, on the other hand if any one shall decline to admit the existence of ideas of objects, through regard for such difficulties, or to posit an idea for every class of phenomena, he will be left without a resting-place for his mind unless he allows a self-identical and eternal idea of each group of particulars; and as a consequence

V lxiv οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. *Id.* 135 B.

he will destroy the possibility of reasoned thought. What you say is true.'

W What shall we then conclude from this short survey of the Platonic ἰδέαι as to their usefulness in the history of thought? Do they represent the necessary abstractions of all general thinking, indispensable no less to the scientist than to the poet, or must we greet them merely with the smile that we give to the child whose *naïveté* recalls to us our own bygone infancy, but for all practical purposes relegate them to the lumber-room of the mind's discarded clothes? Has the scientific enthusiast of to-day any real quarrel with the great teacher of the Academy, or, on the other hand, is he even beholden to his teaching? To answer such questions we must refer once more to the genesis of the ideal doctrine. No system of thought can be fairly judged apart from its chronological conditions. If we would rightly estimate the extent of the debt which the world owes to Plato we must consider the opponents of Plato. Most people will extend their sympathy to the champion who strikes a blow for truth against apparently overwhelming scepticism; and no less than this was the task undertaken by the great Athenian philosopher and disciple of Socrates. Heracleiteanism threatened to engulf the whole of the philosophic world, and the tide had set strong towards a polite acquiescence in the impossibility of settled Truth. The ceaseless changes observable in natural phenomena, along with the apparent inadequacy of men's senses to their investigation, as well as the

individual idiosyncrasies of those endowed with such senses, seemed conclusive against the idea of a permanent order which men might know and rest in; and when these weapons of the pseudo-physicist were reinforced by the destructive criticism of the Sophists in the regions of moral and political life, the case for scepticism appeared complete.

Against such negative forces as these Plato opposed a positive and constructive theory of knowledge. On two sides he found permanency, where his opponents found nothing but transience and change. One such stable element he detects on the subjective side, the other on the objective. It is his distinction to have in some measure anticipated the constructive work afterwards accomplished by Kant, who was for philosophy what Copernicus was for science, in showing that the world of our experience only becomes intelligible in virtue of the formative laws of human reason, and the unalterable categories of thought, which constitute the essence of a knowing subject, and which are in that sense even prior to experience. Having rescued the subjective factor of knowledge from being the sport of circumstance and of blind and alien forces, Plato next turns to the objective side. Here too he saw there must be corresponding permanence, if science was to make good her foothold. Such permanence he found, as we have seen, in the separate ideal world of his philosophic creation; and the reasons for seeking it there we have seen to have been his partial understanding of the uniformity of Nature, combined with the confusion of the antithesis of subject and object with that of mind and matter. And yet we must not suppose Plato to have been without the conception of

W uniformity, even if, which is at least a moot point, he failed to recognize it in the order of the phenomenal world. On the contrary, his whole ideal theory is a crying demand for uniformity, without which he knew knowledge, properly so called, to be impossible. The untiring insistence that he lays upon the identity, eternity, and self-consistency (*ὁμολογούμενον αὑτῷ*) of each separate idea, on the one hand, and the fixed order of their inter-relations, on the other, are nothing less than the explicit asseveration of the uniformity of Nature, even though this Nature as we conceive of it is not the *φύσις* of the Greek philosopher. The mere fact that Plato's 'Nature' is his transcendental world, and not the world of sight and touch, is of little importance compared with the great truth that uniformity, no matter in what sphere, is seen to be at once the true basis of Nature and the fundamental assumption of science. The human mind has to pass through much travail before it can shake off the pre-suppositions of centuries that seem to be so plainly written on the face of the universe, and to be dictated for its acceptance. If even to-day we allow ourselves to speak of 'faults' in Nature, we can hardly be surprised that Plato should conceive of chaos as equally legitimate with order, or regard the phenomenal world as a compromise between the two. We can then afford to make Plato a present of his inherited cosmogony, in return for the truly philosophical conception that he gives us of the permanent order in the 'ideas' which constitute his natural (or ideal) world.

That there can be no science without some theory of ideas will be admitted by a modern scientist as

readily as by Socrates or Parmenides. For, as already stated, science is also engaged on the work of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις—i. e. of finding similarities and dissimilarities in Nature. Her attitude, however, is necessarily altogether different from that of Plato's day. We are the inheritors of Greek thought, and we use with more or less ease the logical weapons they so carefully wrought. We can hardly over-estimate the debt we owe to a writer like Plato for the patience with which he cleared the ground of all the natural stumbling-blocks to mental progress, and with which he delivered human reason from the purely logical fallacies that so easily beset it. Until this was done, until the mind was freed from its own delusions and given sufficient strength and insight to enable it to trample upon the spurious and hybrid forms of thinking which by their apparent cogency threatened to strangle all true advance, not even the first steps could be taken towards the conquest of Nature. We may account for the apparent failure of the Greeks in the physical sciences by their want of adequate instruments or by whatever other causes we choose, but we must remember that the essential, the greatest instrument of all, without which no others can be worked, is the organon of the human intellect. If we to-day can concentrate all our energies upon the improvement of our material instruments in the investigation of Nature, it is only because the previous indispensable work was first done for us by the Greeks. The so-called three primary laws of thought, the precise significance of 'not-being,' all the fallacies lying round the countless forms of equivocation—until man's intellect was rendered master of such as

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W these, what mastery could it hope to win over the multiplex nature set over against it? The tyranny of words must first be pulled down, before a true freedom of thought could issue in an experimentation which should at once combine speculative daring and rational control. The positive results we go to Plato for are not, then, and could not be, any direct progress in the physical sciences, and to hunt through the *Timaeus* with a keen scent for detecting very doubtful 'anticipations' of more modern discoveries, is mistaken zeal. Plato's permanent contribution to science is far better represented by his philosophic distinction of Knowledge and Opinion, *νοῦς* or *νόησις* and *ἀληθὴς δόξα*; or again, by the similar distinction between *διαλεκτική* and *ἐριστική* and the clearness with which he there contrasts the fundamental importance of natural as opposed to artificial or merely verbal classification, with the latter of which the 'eristic' and the rhetorician made such play.

Finally, as we have so often said, he has laid down once and for ever the true characteristics of scientific knowledge and natural law in the main features of his ideal world, undisturbed as it is by the opposing forces which he held to invalidate the world of phenomena. To us on the other hand the world is no longer the copy of a divine model; it is divine itself, if anything be divine. But the Platonic search after universals, that are eternal and immutable, was not in vain. From it has sprung our conviction in a fixed order of Nature, however complex and hidden from us this may be. We believe that the knowledge of this order can be won by working for it; and that there are ultimate *ὁρισμοί* of all things. But we

realize at the same time that our progress is a progress, and that our 'ideas' must constantly be recast as the material under our hand shows richer ore. We know that they too are in a state of flux, and as unstable as Plato holds the world of sense to be. They too are, and are long likely to remain, ὑποθέσεις, practically certain, but not as yet perfectly known; not until all things can be shown as an ordered development from an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος, which shall not be divorced from phenomena but omnipresent in them, in a sphere where the function of the ἔκγονος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is immediately that of the αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν. W

FINIS